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1 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer 
Over the past eighteen months, South Africa's cities and towns have become a 
focus of national and international attention, by virtue of sustained protest 
and unrest in African and coloured communities. The unrest has not been 
localised; it spread from the Vaal Triangle to the Witwatersrand, towns in 
part of the Free State, the Eastern Cape, Durban, Pretoria and most recently 
the Western Cape. The issues underlying the unrest are national in their 
scope. All urban areas in South Africa are at risk. 
Unrest: Complexity of Causes 
The anatomy of the unrest is highly complex and defies simple diagnosis. 
Certainly it includes political mobilisation, some of it with revolutionary 
dims. In as much as the action on the streets has been mainly (but not 
exclusively) carried out by teenagers and young adults, it reflects 
pathological stresses in the school systems for Africans and hugely 
inadequate employment opportunities, particularly for young adults and school 
leavers. Other socio-political and social psychological factors are easily 
identified. 
Among the complexitity of causes, however, is the issue of the quality of 
life in African urban areas, including services, service charges, transport 
costs, rentals, maintenance of rented housing, amenities and facilities and 
the general environment of the townships. 
This is not mere speculation. Before the current wave of unrest was underway, 
rent and service charge protests and a bus boycott in Larnontville in Durban 
led to violent confrontations with the authorities (Fick 1983). The eruption 
of violence in the Vaal Triangle (particularly Sharpeville) initially 
involved large scale householder protest against proposed monthly service 
charge increases of just under R6. During this protest it was estimated that 
at least 60 percent of African employees stayed away from work in a one-day 
boycott on September 3rd 1984. This event, which unleashed confrontations 
between demonstrators and police which claimed 72 lives and led to over 1 000 
arrests; was the culmination of a long period of agitation over rentals and 
service charges, and mounting rental arrears in townships like Lekoa, Evaton, 
Sebokeng, Sharpeville and others. 
The one-man official investigation into the Vaal Triangle disturbances by 
Prof Tjaart van der Walt, rector of the University of Potchefstroom, found, 
contrary to expectations, that youth problems and education were not the 
major causes of the unrest, but pointed instead at the new local authority 
system, maladministration, probable corruption at local level and widespread 
ignorance among residents of the way local government functioned (Cooper et 
al 1984: p64). 
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African Local Government 
The issue of local government has been dramatised recently by numerous and 
widespread attacks on and assassinations of African local councillors during 
the unrest. To date some 75 African local counci1lors have been the victims 
of attacks on their persons or homes and at least five have died. Under the 
impact of these threats only some five of the 38 newly created African town 
councils are properly functioning. Up to June 1985, 240 African councillors 
and officials, including 27 mayors, resigned. 
To reduce explanations, of the unrest to failings in African local government 
and administration would be naive. These issues are prominent in the mix of 
factors which create an environment of instability, however. African local 
government in South Africa is an issue charged with potential for violence 
and instability. Suspicion of government motives is widespread in the African 
communities, and an emerging view often heard in extra-parliamentary 
opposition circles is that the intention of reforms in local government are 
to provide some material and practical benefits, so as to facilitate and 
disguise a strategy of deflecting African political energies and interests 
away from the central franchise. Municipal and regional government 
development will more and more be presented as a 'co-optive' process to 
divide and weaken the popular struggle. 
The Regional Services Councils Act 
It is in this broad context, as well as in the context of a serious economic 
recession and forecasts of high inflation rates as the economy starts to 
recover, that a major new constitutional initiative at the third and second 
tiers of government is about to be launched: The Regional Services Councils 
Act (Act 109 of 1985). In the words of Minister Chris Heunis, 'In terms of 
this Act, integrated local government bodies, regional services councils 
(RSCs) will be established to rationalise area-wide local government services 
to provide effective political representation for ail (including black) 
communities in a region ana to generate funds primarily for the development 
of black, Indian and coloured areas' (Financial Mail 23/8/85). 
The new form of regional authority proposed is certainly a very challenging 
development and has some powerfully reformist elements. Basically, as the 
Minister has indicated, it involves new forms of taxation of private 
enterprise at local level (a levy on wages and salaries and on turnover) to 
finance the functions of over-arching regional councils which will 
administer, deliver or take responsibility for major infrastructural or 
'hard' services of a non-political, and non-social or cultural nature across 
all local authorities in a region. While representation will be in terms of a 
formula based on the individual municipalities' shares of the total payments 
for the use of the services in the region, it is stated in the Act that 'the 
counci 1 shal 1 give preference to the establishment, improvement and 
maintenance of infrastructural services and infrastructural faci1ities in 
areas where the greatest needs therefor exist' (Section 12 (6) of Act No 109 
of 1985). 
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The new councils are not democratic in the conventional sense therefore, in 
that representation is loaded in favour of the local authorities which 
consume the greatest amount of services. The element of redistribution is 
prominent, however, since the priority will have to be to build up the 
service infrastructure of the poorer local authorities before spending money 
on the authorities in whose areas the funds are raised. 
A major dimension in the Act, as implied above, is a separation of 
'political' and infrastructural or 'non-political' matters. Local authorities 
or other local bodies such as management committees or local affairs 
committees will remain racially segregated and will collect rates to render 
sensitive services of a social or cultural nature. In a sentence the RSCs are 
a way of protecting white local self-determination and community segregation, 
while taxing the productive resources of a region to develop the 
infrastructure in segregated African, coloured ana Indian municipalities 
which have an inadequate tax base. 
In one sense, therefore, the new Act appears to be as materially progressive 
as it could be within the constraints of residential and political 
segregation. Minister Heunis comments that 1 political participation on 
local government level will be democratically extended to include other 
communities without seriously destabilising the present system of local 
government. This is the only way to bring about evolutionary reforms in any 
society' (Financial Mail op cit). There is no doubt that the new councils 
will be a departure from conventional apartheid. The local authorities and/or 
organisations will be nominating members to multiracial decisionmaking forums 
in a society in which multiracialism has been taboo for nearly four decades. 
While conceding that the new legislation is important and innovative, one 
must nevertheless ask whether it will work. Reform in the South African 
political climate is hazardous. This society has seen other 'reforms', like 
the introduction of the tricameral parliament or the abortive proposed 
changes to influx control of 1982/3, unleashing massive protests and 
boycotts. In asking whether the new legislation will work the following 
questions must be addressed, here posed in random order: 
• Will it gain acceptance among African, coloured and Indian local 
communities? 
• Will it survive white political reactions in a situation of inevitable 
competition between local authorities? 
• What will it's effects be on economic growth and employment creation in the 
major industrial centres of the country? 
• Is it a genuine devolution of power to the third tier of government or is 
it a decentralisation of functions with a centralisation of authority and 
control? 
• W i l l it address the most critical developmental needs of the poorest local 
communities? And, 
• if it works, what will its effects and implications be in the wider process 
of change towards a democratic political order? 
In the sections which follow, various authors will analyse the legislation or 
aspects of the problems it must address. In so doing they will answer some of 
these questions. In the conclusions we will endeavour to draw together 
answers to these and other major questions, as a basis for an assessment of 
the new development. We commence, however, with an exposition by Mark Bennett 
of Indicator SA of the new Act and the regional functions it will create. 
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2 F R O M T H E T O P D O W N 
Regional Services Councils' Structures 
By Mark Bennett, Indicator SA Researcher 
New Dispensations 
Following much vaunted reforms at the first tiers of government, the ruling 
party and its various administrative functionaries then redirected their 
attention in a flurry of legislative activity to political and administrative 
structures at lower levels, which hitherto had remained relatively unaffected 
by legislative adjustments. 
In 1984, in the final session of South Africa's last all-white parliament, 
Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis claimed that 
the government would be seeking to extend those 'guide plans' encapsulated in 
the 1983 constitution through the establishment of new local and regional 
government structures, in order to give expression to the central philosophy 
behind the new constitutional dispensation: that every race group 'should 
have self-determination with regard to its own affairs and co-responsibility 
for matters of common concern'. 
With regard to his party's attitude towards the specific mechanics of local 
and regional government and administration, Minister Heunis stated that the 
government accepted: 
• 'the principle of maximum devolution of powers and decentralisation of 
administration to the local level of government and of minimal administrative 
control over local authorities', 
• that 'wherever possible, local authorities should be established for the 
various population groups on a territorial basis, subject to adequate 
financial arrangements to ensure their viability', and 
• that 'on a metropolitan or regional level, joint services will probably 
have to be rendered for which purpose bodies will have to be established 1 
(Hansard No 22 1984: col 10762). 
However, in the same speech he warned that the government would not allow an 
extension of the decisionmaking process to the 'lowest level' if this meant 
that local authorities were going to sabotage government policy at the 
'national level' (ibid). 
The Need for Local Level Reform 
A consequence of the absence of coloured or Indian representatives on 
Provincial Councils, the second tier of government, has been that neither the 
'own' or 'general affairs' concepts encapsulated in the new constitutional 
dispensation could be given expression at the regional administrative level. 
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To a lesser degree, at the municipal level, there was also a need to increase 
black influence as whites had monopolised most important administrative and 
decisionmaking functions. 
There was, therefore, an urgent need for the government to establish a system 
that would allow the other race groups to be able to regulate or influence 
matters that affected their 'own affairs', simply to give some local 
expression to the central concept of the new constitution, namely the 
division between 'own' and 'general affairs'. No legitimacy could accrue to 
the new dispensation without at least some evidence of the operation of this 
concept at the local and regional levels. 
The government did of course have the theoretical option to triplicate, at 
phenomenal expense, the entire tri-cameral parliamentary structures all the 
way down the line, so as to allow all races represented at the first tier to 
have separate 'own' and 'general affairs' representation at successive lower 
tiers of government and administration. In practice however this would have 
been not only regressive but financially impossible, as the Director of 
Constitutional Planning and Development, Mr Len Dekker, pointed out (SAIRR 
1984: p156). He argued that to repeat the parliamentary system of three 
separate houses for the Indian, coloured and white communities at the 
provincial level alone would mean the prospect of establishing 11 Provincial 
Councils - three for each province (except for Indians in the Orange Free 
State) - with more than 300 MPCs and their attendant civil service 
bureaucrats! 
Local Finance 
Coinciding with the urgent need to find a more acceptable political 
dispensation for all race groups at the municipal and provincial levels, the 
government was faced with pressures from white local authorities. 
Over time white loqal authorities, due to the dual effects of increasing 
fluctuations in the economy and increases in the rate of inflation, found 
that their own revenue base was inadequate to deal with rising demands for 
services. Consequently they began to lobby government to provide more 
remunerative structures within which to generate revenue at the local level 
(see article by Gorven). 
Its already overstressed exchequer unable to assist, the government responded 
by establishing the Browne and then later the Croeser Committees, to 
investigate the possibilities of expanding the revenue bases of primary local 
authorities. Both committees recognised that the most serious financial 
crisis existed in local authorities for urban blacks. They recommended that 
far from giving priority to the needs of white municipalities, the government 
should rather take immediate steps to redress the severe financial crises in 
black communities. Government efforts to find an acceptable system of 
representation for urban Africans have been repeatedly thwarted by virtual 
collapse of the Black Local Authority (BLA) system. 
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Collapse of the BLAs 
To a large extent, the financial disintegration of the BLA system can be 
attributed to government efforts to make BLAs as financially self-sufficient 
as possible. Unlike white areas and to a lesser degree coloured and Indian 
areas, African areas do not have any tax base sufficient enough to sustain 
autonomous growth. 
This lack of revenue to improve services and infrastructure has exacerbated 
the rejection of BLAs by African communities; many African residents view 
them as little more than extensions of the grand apartheid edifice. 
Severe rioting in the Vaal Triangle townships in September 1984, which 
resulted in the death of a number of African town councillors and mayors, 
were in many cases a direct response to increases in rent and service 
charges, instituted by BLAs to generate revenue. 
Transfer Payments: A Remedial Step 
Consequently steps which would improve the financial viability of BLAs, 
instead of forcing already impoverished African communities to contribute to 
their own upkeep, stood a better chance of increasing the legitimacy of 
African local government structures. Thus the recommendations of the Browne 
and Croeser committees, that additional finance to improve underdeveloped and 
underserviced black residential areas could be obtained by transfer payments 
of revenue generated in the more affluent white areas, became increasingly 
more attractive for the government. 
The government plan began to swing cumbersomely into action: certain central 
government functions would be devolved to lower tiers, while ultimate control 
of some traditional municipal functions would be transferred upwards to the 
three-chamber parliament. Thus a metropolitan system of regional government, 
which would be responsible for providing a number of common municipal 
services to all race groups in a specific geo-political region and for the 
raising of revenue to perform such tasks, came into being. 
To act as an interface between these metropolitan administrations and 
parliament, a government-appointed Administrator with a small Provincial 
Executive is scheduled to be created (see diagram on following page). 
In this context, the Regional Services Councils Act No 109 of 1985 finally 
became law: the keystone in an edifice of reform initiatives aimed at 
changing traditional local and provincial government politics and 
administration. 
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FROM THE TOP DOWN 
REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS 
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What the Act says — RSC Structures 
'To provide for the joint exercise and earring out of powers 
and duties in relation to certain functions in certain areas 
by local bodies with such areas; and to that end to provide 
for the delimitation of regions; the establishment of regional 
services councils; and the constitution, functioning, 
functions, powers, duties, assets, rights, employees, and 
financing of such councils; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.' 
Preamble to the Regional Services Councils Act No 109, 1985 
i) Local Authorities — The third tier 
With the establishment of Regional Services Councils (RSCs), the various 
primary local authorities for Indians, coloureds, whites and to a lesser 
degree for Africans will be responsible for the administration of the 'own 
affairs' of their particular race group at the municipal level, for example 
over issues such as housing, hospitals, community development and social 
welfare. All elected and administrative officials at this level will be 
answerable to the regional offices of the central government's various 'own 
affairs' administrations, which in turn fall under the control of the various 
Minister's Councils in the House of Delegates, Representatives and Assembly. 
As no genuine first tier 'own affairs' structures exist for Africans - except 
for homeland administrations - African representatives in BLAs will continue 
to liaise with white officials in the Development Boards, which now fall 
under the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. 
Concomitantly, the RSCs will have no control over the 'own affairs' functions 
performed by primary local authorities. 
In terms of the 'general affairs' philosophy enshrined in the Constitution 
Act of 1983, a number of service and administrative functions performed by 
local authorities, and deemed to be the common concern of all races, will be 
removed from their jurisdiction and transferred upwards into the control of 
the RSCs (Section 3 (1)(b)). At the same time, some functions controlled by 
other existing local bodies like the Natal Development and Services Board, 
water corporations, divisional councils and the Transvaal Board for the 
Development of Peri-Urban Areas, will be rationalised and transferred to the 
RSCs (Section 3 (2)(a)) (Financial Mail 23/8/85). 
No compensation will be paid to any local authority which surrenders any 
rights or transfers any assets to the RSCs (Section 4 (4)). However, Section 
4 (3)(a)(ii) of the Act does allow certain municipalities to perform some 
regional functions on an agency basis, for example the retail and/or bulk 
supply of electricity and water - in this case it will be the larger white 
municipalities which are most likely to be able to be in a position to retail 
these services. 
Further, all local authorities in a particular region serviced by a RSC will 
be compelled to use only those services offered by that Council - unless 
granted an exemption (Section 5). This clause caused concern as it has 
precluded communities from exercising their freedom of choice, for instance, 
9 
a relatively poor municipality may be adversely affected by a decision aimed 
to satisfy a more affluent neighbour (Assocom 1985: p5). 
Office-Bearers 
Local authorities have to nominate elected office-bearers from their ranks to 
sit on the RSC; members of RSCs are therefore not directly accountable to the 
ratepayers of a municipality but to the primary local authority that 
nominated them (Section 6 (2)). This has angered some critics who argue that 
it contradicts government statements that RSCs are to be an expression of the 
grassroots power of communities. All nominated representatives may hold 
office for a maximum period of five years, but after the expiration of their 
term of office may be eligible for renomination (Section 8 (1) & (2)(a)). The 
long tenure of local authority representatives on the Councils could mean 
that the RSCs become saddled with Indian, coloured and particularly African 
representatives from primary local authorities which in-the eyes of their 
electorate, already have little popular support or legitimacy. 
Representatives on RSCs are not in a secure position, for the local authority 
which nominated them onto the council has the power to withdraw their 
nomination at any time (Section 8 (3)(c)). This 'apparently democratic' 
clause potentially threatens to disrupt the functioning of the RSC system, as 
it may result in some well-meaning and dedicated members of RSCs, ie those 
committed to upgrading the infrastructure of black communities, being 
withdrawn by more conservative elements in municipalities or by ratepayers in 
third-tier elections. 
Each local authority is theoretically allowed to have as many votes as is 
equal to the proportion between the amount paid by local authorities for 
regional services (excluding regional services consumed in industrial areas 
or central business districts) and the total revenue obtained by the RSC as a 
result of the provision of its services (Section 9 (1)(a)). In an apparent 
effort to prevent richer white local authorities from dominating 
decisionmaking processes, the Act states that if there are more than two 
authorities represented on a RSC, no local authority can have more than 50 
percent of the total number of votes on the Council (Section 9 (2)(a)), nor 
may any primary local authority have more than five members on a RSC (Section 
6 (2)). However, there is little to prevent a number of white municipalities 
- whose interests are more likely to converge - from ganging together to pass 
a vote. 
In the dying days of the 1985 parliamentary session, in an effort to 
discourage Indian and coloured parliamentarians from blocking the passage of 
the RSC Bill, the government agreed to investigate ways of substantially 
increasing the tax base of the Indian and coloured Management and Local 
Affairs Committees. Consequently it announced that in future the old system 
of traditionally including industrial areas in white local authorities would 
no longer continue, and that when new local authority areas were demarcated, 
industrial areas would be re-allocated to the local authority areas from 
which most of the workers came (Daily News 5/6/85). When such a procedure 
becomes operational, it could amount to a back-door scrapping of the Group 
Areas Act - at least as far as industrial areas are concerned. 
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ii) Regional Services Councils — The second tier 
Aside from political considerations, the main raison d'etre behind the 
establishment of RSCs has been an attempt by the government to rationalise a 
number of the service and caretaker functions performed by racially defined 
local authorities and Provincial Councils under the control of a single 
multiracial umbrella body. 
By transferring these functions upwards from local authorities - and 
downwards in the case of some Provincial Council functions - into the 
jurisdiction of RSCs the government aims to: 
® achieve economies of scale and increase efficiency by reducing the costly 
duplication of services that presently occurs, with each race groups' local 
authority being responsible for the provision of services to their own 
communities; 
® reduce traditional white domination in the provision of some of these 
service and planning functions; and 
9 improve the infrastructural development of black communities. 
In accordance with the 'own/general affairs' ethic, only those functions that 
are deemed to be the common concern of all race groups will be administered 
and controlled by the RSCs. The government envisages that each RSC will be 
responsible for the provision of more than 21 services (see box). 
FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS 
t Bulk supply of water 9 Ambulance and fire brigade services 
9 Bulk supply of electricity 9 Health services 
9 Sewerage purification works 9 Airports 
and main sewerage disposal 9 Civil defence 
pipelines 9 Libraries 
9 Land useage and transport 9 Museums 
planning in the region 9 Recreation facilities 
9 Roads and stormwater drainage 9 Environment conservation 
9 Passenger transport services 9 Promotion of tourism 
9 Traffic matters 9 The establishment, improvement and 
9 Abattoirs maintenance of other infrastructural 
9 Fresh produce markets services and facilities 
9 Refuse dumps 9 Other regional functions 
9 Cemeteries and crematoriums 
Source: Schedule 2 RSC Act. 
However, the question of to which geographic areas (political areas in the 
South African context as a result of the Group Areas Act) these service 
functions are allocated among the various racial groups, is critical. Perhaps 
the most important section of the Act states that as a matter of policy, the 
'council shall give preference to the establishment, improvement and 
maintenance of infrastructural services and infrastructural facilities in 
areas where the greatest needs therefor exist' (Section 12 (6)). 
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Although the terminology might be colourblind, it is clear that as a result 
of the inadequate, if not total absence of, facilities and infrastructure in 
Indian, coloured and particularly African areas, most RSCs1 expenditure 
should theoretically be channelled into these regions. 
This policy is bound to be the cause of many disputes within RSCs as various 
racial interest groups on the Councils compete to get a larger share of 
redistributed services. Even before the first RSCs have been established, 
some white local authorities have expressed concern at being forced into RSCs 
adjacent to large underserviced black areas, as they fear they will be forced 
to contribute to the upgrading of the poorer areas. 
Although the new system of rationalising the provision of services is bound 
to achieve certain savings and. increase efficiency, critics have pointed out 
two drawbacks. 
First, organised commerce has argued that as a number of• municipalities are 
already achieving considerable savings in the provision and use of services 
by being party to collective agreements with neighbouring local authorities, 
the compulsion for local authorities to use RSC' services represents an 
unwarranted statutory interference (Assocom 1985: p5). Assocom has argued 
that the market place, in the municipal sense, already provides the 
motivation for striving for optimal utilisation of resources and best value 
for money in terms of services required and provided. 
Second, it is argued that the government's policy of trying to achieve cost 
reductions and improve efficiency by encouraging the common provision and use 
of 'general affairs' municipal services is being counteracted by the 'own 
affairs' ethic, which compels all third-tier authorities to provide racially 
separate services. They claim that the only way of securing a cost-effective 
and efficient system of third and second-tier government would be to get rid 
of the 'own affairs' ethic and to provide all services on a multiracial basis 
(Lear and Winter 1985: p3). 
RSCs will have all the powers and duties of a local authority in the control 
of these general services or an official in the employment of a local 
authority, except that the Councils will not have the power to raise revenue 
by levying rates on immovable property (Section 4 (1)(a)). 
Finance 
In order to finance the provision of these regional services, the government 
expects each RSC to raise its own revenue. There are three ways in which the 
RSC can raise the necessary finance: 
§ 'loans', 'interest on investments', 'donations' and 'fines' (Section 12 
(2)); 
• a regional services levy (payroll tax) (Section 12 (1)); and 
• regional establishment levy (turnover tax) (Section 12 (1)). 
A fourth new source of revenue, an 'investment tax', was originally proposed, 
but due to pressure from organised business and commerce was shelved and 
referred to the Margo Commission of Inquiry into South African tax structures 
for further investigation. 
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The turnover tax will be calculated by taxing a percentage of the total sales 
on which a vendor pays general sales tax (GST), including turnover on certain 
food items on which GST is not payable (Star 9/5/85). A tax of a similar 
proportion will also be paid on the turnover of persons who are not vendors. 
Likewise, the payroll tax will be calculated by taxing a percentage of the 
total wage bill of all employers, which includes amounts paid to directors of 
private and public companies, taxable benefits to employees, and profits paid 
to partners and sole traders by withdrawals or loans (ibid). 
Importantly Section 12 (7) makes it illegal for employers or vendors to 
recover any of the payroll of turnover taxes paid 'by adding it as a separate 
item to his prices or tariffs or the cost of his services or by deducting it 
from the wages or salaries paid by him'. Any person who fails to pay the 
taxes or who contravenes Section 12 (7) could be liable to a maximum fine of 
R5 000 or a period of up to 12 months imprisonment or a combination of both 
(Section 12 (9)). However, the Deputy-Director of Finance, Gerhard Croeser, 
one of the main architects of the new taxation system, has pointed out that 
in effect the consumer will ultimatly contribute towards the tax (Financial 
Mail 14/6/85). 
Both these taxes will be regarded as a deductable business expense, which 
means that the government could, in an indirect way, 'foot half the bill' 
through lost taxes. Further, as the government is an employer it will also be 
liable to pay tax on the salaries it pays (ibid). Section 12 (1)(b) does 
however allow the Minister of Finance, after consultation with the 
Administrator and the RSC, to exempt any category of 'employer, vendor or 
person from any levy'. 
In an attempt to improve the quality of civil servants who will be working iri 
these reorganised second and third-tier structures, the Act makes it 
compulsory for RSCs to pay one-twentieth of a percent of a year's revenue to 
the training fund established in term of the Local Government Training Act 
No. 41 of 1985 (Section 12 (5)). 
The rates at which both the payroll and turnover taxes are levied is not 
uniform for all the proposed RSCs. Each RSC, with the concurrence of the 
Minister of Finance, will be responsible for determining the taxing rates in 
their own areas (Section 1 (xi) and (xiv)). The ability of each RSC to choose 
- with the support of the Minister of Finance - the tax rates could mean that 
a skillful manipulation of the tax rates in each RSC area could promote 
either massive industrialisation (with low rates) or industrial 
deconcentration as entrepreneurs shift their investment portfolios and/or 
assets to take advantage of differingytax structures. The fact that the 
Minister of Finance has the ultimate say in determination of the rates has 
prompted some critics to claim that the government will use its powers on the 
RSCs to promote industrial decentralisation (see articles by Solomon and 
Gildenhuys). 
The ability to choose taxes could be a double-edged sword, for if a RSC 
decides to levy relatively high taxes in order to improve the infrastructure 
and services within black areas, it may discourage investment within the 
region and induce other business to leave to find a lower tax region, thereby 
increasing unemployment which would affect the black communities the most. 
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African Representation 
Importantly, the Act is significantly different from a 1984 draft version of 
the Bill, in that the government has allowed for the inclusion of African 
local authority representatives with equal status and theoretically equal 
voting powers to be included into the Councils (Section 1 (v)). However, even 
though the inclusion of African representatives may be viewed as an attempt 
to broaden the democratic base of second-tier government, the plan is beset 
with problems. Recent violence in many African townships has been directed by 
communities at the 'elected' representatives in BLAs, and consequently a 
number of these bodies are at present totally inoperative, thus placing BLA 
representative representation on RSCs in doubt. 
Minister Heunis claims that those African authorities that have been 
dissolved will not be represented on a RSC for as long as an elected 
management body for that region is absent (Financial Mail 23/8/85). However, 
legislation opening the way for white functionaries to run black local 
authorities was approved by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Co-
operation and Development in 1985. In terms of the legislation, the State 
President could dissolve a black local authority if he believes such an 
authority is unable to exercise, perform and fulfill any right, power, 
function or duty assigned to it, and to appoint white functionaries. 
Professors Schlemmer and Giliomee have succinctly noted in a similar vein 
that the RSC system 'provides nothing more than a delegation of 
administrative service functions which in many areas will reintroduce an 
unsympathetic white bureaucracy into the townships with a vengeance1 
(Financial Mail 2/8/85). 
'Foreign' Local Authorities 
In addition to the inclusion of BLA representatives, the government has also 
catered for the inclusion of other communities, particularly African, which 
are not located within the borders of South Africa, ie those which are part 
of 'independent' homelands. However they may only be incorporated into RSCs 
after the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Administrator 
(Section 4 (3)(a)(iii) & (iv)). The voting strengths of these representatives 
will not be determined by their financial contribution to the Council, but by 
an agreement negotiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Possibly one of the reasons why the government has allowed for 'foreign' 
commuter townships to be included into RSCs is that it hopes that the 
Councils could, through their redistributive mechanisms, improve the 
transportation services between white South Africa and the black commuter 
suburbs. A consequence of the Group Areas Act, which forces many black 
commuters to travel long distances to work, has been an ever increasing 
politicisation of all transport issues; which in certain instances has 
resulted in severe dislocation for white business and commerce. Section 12 
(6)(d) states that a RSC will use part of their revenue in order to pay for 
the 'costs of the establishment, improvement and maintenance of an 
infrastructure for and the running of transport services for commuters 
between their places of residence within or outside the region or outside the 
Republic and their places of employment in the region'. 
14 
iii) The Administrator and Executive Committee — Government appointees 
In terms of the RSC Act, the current system of Provincial government which 
has served the white community for more than 75 years, will disappear. The 
Provincial Councils will be replaced by an Administrator who, in turn, will 
have an Executive Committee (EXCO). The EXCOwill be multiracial, and the Act 
does not preclude the possibility of the Administrator being black. 
Both the Administrator and his EXCO will not be elected by the population of 
the area they are to oversee, but instead will be nominated by the State 
Pr&sident. The government intends the Administrator to be a direct link 
between the RSCs and parliament, while the new EXCOs will act as proxies for 
government by looking after general affairs at the provincial or regional 
level (Business Day 15/5/85). The EXCOs in each province will be directly 
answerable to a parliamentary standing committee composed of parliamentarians 
from each province (Daily News 5/6/85). Both the Administrator and his/her 
EXCO will be in charge of general affairs issues and will have little control 
over the affairs of the primary local authorities at the third tier. 
There is also a possibility that there will be more than the current four 
Administrators, one for each province. There are indications that the 
government intends establishing a single Administrator and EXCO in Natal and 
the Orange Free State, but three each in both the Transvaal and the Cape. 
Some commentators have construed this as a burgeoning of a bureaucracy; 
something which the government has stated that RSCs will reduce. 
Establishment of RSCs 
One of the prime functions of the Administrator will be to oversee the 
establishment of RSCs. In doing so he must work in conjunction with the 
multiracial Demarcation Boards which fall under the control of the Department 
of Constitutional Development and Planning. In guidelines laid down for the 
establishment of a RSC the Administrator must: 
• consider the existing boundaries such as rivers, mountains, railway lines, 
roads and watersheds; 
• ensure that the region must be an economically-bound unit within which 
inhabitants live, work, commute and relax, and where they spend most of their 
income; and 
9 ensure that the region must be financially self-sufficient in the cost of 
joint provision of services and the 'satisfaction of the general needs in the 
region' (Daily News 9/6/85). 
Once established, an Administrator may alter the boundaries of a RSC by 
combining two or more regions, including any area - whether it is contiguous 
to the area or not - and revoke the delimitation of a region (Section 2 (1)). 
In the execution of these duties he is, however, as with most other powers of 
the Administrator, bound to get the consent of: 
9 the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning; 
• the 'Minister appointed to administer local government in respect of black 
communities'; 
% the Minister of Finance; 
• the local government Ministers in the Ministers' CounciIs in the House of 
Delegates, Representatives and Assembly (Section 2 (2)(a)). 
15 
The Administrator need only consult with the local bodies in the region or an 
already established RSC (Section 2 (2)(b)). 
In order to ensure the smooth functioning of the RSC, the Administrator may 
also transfer or second to a Council any person employed by a local 
authority, province or state (Section 3 (2)(b)). This provision, although 
allowing the Administrator to choose the best official for a job, could also 
leave the way for the Administrator - himself a political appointment - to 
appoint officers in some areas that might be regarded as politically 
sensitive, in order to ensure that government policy is followed. This clause 
may be seen to further erode the democratic base of the RSCs. 
Government Control 
Central government control over the RSCs is further increased as the 
Administrator also has the power to appoint or remove the chairman of each 
Council (Section 7 (1)); after the concurrence of the Minister in charge of 
African affairs and the local government Minister in the Ministers' Councils. 
The chairman will not be allowed to vote. 
One of the most critical functions that the Administrator is able to perform 
on RSCs is that of being able to pass regulations. Ironically this clause 
seems to contradict Minister Heunis' statement that the new deal at the local 
and regional level was underpinned by the philosophy of a maximum devolution 
of power and decentralisation of administration. 
The provision states that the Administrator may make regulations 'in respect 
of any matter in the Act' (except for financial concerns) 'if he is of the 
opinion that it is necessary or expedient for the effective execution or 
furtherance of the provisions and objects' of the Act (Section 13 (1)(a)). 
This means that when any Council which does not implement - in the manner 
which the government desires - any sections of the Act, its decisions or 
actions may be overridden by regulations. However, the Administrator may only 
gazette regulations after 'consultation' with the Councils for the 
Coordination of Local Government Affairs and after the concurrence of the 
Ministers in charge of 'own affairs' and the Minister in charge of African 
local government (Section 13 (3)). 
A possible reason for the inclusion of this section could be government fears 
that certain extra-parliamentary organisations might break the non-
participation tradition and decide to become involved in the new structures 
in order to wreck their effective operation. 
Protecting Reform 
On the other hand, the clause will also give the government a means whereby 
it can prevent certain RSCs, if collectively dominated by a number of 
conservative white primary local authorities, from subverting the reform 
process, eg where RSCs refuse to assist in the improvement of services in 
African areas. As Minister Heunis noted in parliament, the government would 
not allow a decentralisation of decisionmaking if it were to allow local 
authorities an opportunity to 'sabotage' government policy at the 'national 
level'. 
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Any member of a Council which refuses to carry out a regulation passed by the 
Administrator will be liable to a maximum fine of R5 000 or a period of 12 
months imprisonment or both (Section 13 (5)). 
Central government control over the RSCs is once again strengthened by the 
appearance of a number of Cabinet Ministers and the Administrator on the 
appeal board, which is designed to resolve dispute between the various racial 
interest groups that are represented on the Councils (Section 11). 
Any decision of a Council must be decided by a two-third majority of the 
members that constitute a quorum. If no such decision can be reached in 
respect of a vote, it may be put to the vote at the next meeting. However, if 
no final resolution is made the vote will be submitted to an appeal board 
which is comprised of the Administrator, who will be the chairman, the 
Minister in charge of African local government, the three 'own affairs' 
Ministers from the Ministers' Councils appointed to administer local 
government, and the Minister of Finance (where appeals are of a financial 
nature) (Section 11 (3)). 
Primary local authorities may only appeal against: 
s 'the failure of the council to perform a regional function' 
• 'the insufficient performance by the Council of a regional function' 
a 'any decision or proposal of the Council of a priority in connection with 
the appropriation of funds' 
« 'the refusal by the Council of any application for exemption referred to in 
Section 5'. 
A decision by four of the members of the appeal board shall be the decision 
of the board. Since the appeal board is made up of political appointments, it 
is possible that some of its decisions may be achieved by behind-doors 
politicking at the first tier, rather than being made with the genuine 
interests of primary local authorities concerned (see article by Cameron). 
Conclusion 
It is abundantly clear that the government has, with the RSC Act, attempted 
not only to resolve a number of national political dilemmas but also to 
design a system of lower-tier government that is functional. The Act is 
however, if taken in conjunction with recent government pronouncements, a 
very complex piece of often contradictory legislation. 
If the government intends, as Minister Heunis has repeatedly indicated, to 
broaden the democratic process by maximising the participation of other race 
groups at all levels, why has it then included in the Act a number of checks 
and balances which mean that ultimate control rests with government-appointed 
functionaries who are all, in the final analysis, accountable to the State 
President? 
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Further, the Act flies in the face of reality - that most black communities 
have rejected all forms of separate representation at any level. The fact 
that the government has catered for the inclusion of Africans within new 
structures might represent a major departure from old-style Vewoerdian 
apartheid, but it does not offer any real solutions. The major upheavals in 
the country's African townships over the past 18 months which followed the 
introduction of a constitution that entrenched separate representation, can 
be indirectly linked to these new forms of government. The RSC Act not only 
further entrenches political separation, but one of its four pillars, the 
BLAs, has all but disintegrated, and its remnants are only kept going with 
active support from some government ministries. Only time, however, will 
judge the success of the Act. 
Sources 
Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom), 'Memorandum of Comment 
Concerning the Regional Services Council Bill'. June 1985. 
Indicator SA press clippings. 
Lear E, and Winter C, 'The New Regional Services Councils Bill: What are its 
implications for the "Man in the Street'". Dept of Political Studies, 
University of Cape Town June 1985. 
South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Annual Survey 1984. 
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3 F I N A N C I N G A P O L I T I C A L S O L U T I O N 
The Financial Origins of Regional Services Councils 
By Ossie Gorven, retired City Treasurer of Durban 
The impetus which led to the formulation of the Regional Services Councils Act was 
largely political as it originated from the need to give all people within a region a say in 
•local matters of joint concern. The government-created Browne and Croeser 
Committees motivated in a similar vein that services provided for a particular region 
should be financed and controlled by Joint Services Committees. The proposed new 
sources of revenue were suggested because of the unwillingness of white controlled 
municipalities to make transfer payments to other less well-off local authorities, and 
also from the need to finance new expenditure for upgrading of services and 
expenditure on transportation transferred from the government budget. 
The concept of transfer payments in an indirect form is an important feature of the 
Regional Services Councils (RSC) Act, which increases the responsibility of all 
commerce and industry within the jurisdiction of a RSC for the provision of 
infrastructure and services to the poorer areas within the RSC. 
Ossie Gorven, a highly regarded municipal executive in Durban for many years, points 
out how the impetus for increased revenue sources for white municipalities led, over 
the passage of time and through various committees and study groups, to the 
implementation of an essentially political formula to deal with a range of both local and 
national governmental problems. 
As a political formula, the new Act is bound to suffer problems of implementation. 
However, whether it is conceptually flawed in the sense that it fails to come to terms 
with the crisis of legitimacy which presently faces the government at all levels, is a 
question of far greater consequence, upon which the success or failure of the new 
system ultimately depends. 
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Implementing a Political Solution 
The new RSC Act is a response to a number of different needs at both the 
national and regional levels of government in South Africa. Anyone who 
imagines that this new Act will be easily implemented is living in a fool's 
paradise. It is primarily a political system motivated by the need for 
political solutions, and as such will provide far less than the best possible 
framework within which to work, and certainly not the most economical. 
Nevertheless, it is a system which is from the political angle achievable, 
and it is hoped that the legislation will be sufficiently flexible to 
reasonably deal with the problems which are bound to arise, and also to allow 
some degree of local option. 
The system of regional councils has been well tested elsewhere in the world, 
and in certain areas of South Africa can easily be justified. In Durban, 
municipal officials have for some time been examining, for practical, 
economic and governmental reasons, the idea of a regional authority through 
which the people of the whole area could have some say in the provision and 
maintenance of services which to date they have not been able to influence. 
On the national level, the government has sought, through the RSC Act, 
solutions to a number of unique problems of its own: to give some degree of 
political expression at the local level to disenfranchised people; to upgrade 
poor services and infrastructure in deprived African, coloured and Indian 
areas; to provide a revenue base upon which to devolve certain functions 
which have hitherto been the reponsibility of the central government; and to 
accomplish all this within the framework of the Group Areas Act. 
The Financial Origins 
For many years local authorities in South Africa have been faced with a lack 
of revenue sources, and the limited growth potential of those which they do 
have. The traditional revenue-raising methods of local authorities, service 
tariffs and municipal rates, do not respond quickly to changes in the economy 
or the rate of inflation. Municipal rates are particularly inelastic, as 
properties are revalued every three or five years, only then providing an 
element of growth. 
As a result, municipalities have for years been pressing government to assist 
in the provision of alternative sources of income. 
The Browne and Croeser Committees 
The appointment of the Browne Committee of Inquiry into the Financing of 
Local Authorities in South Africa - which published its report in 1980 -
brought little relief to those municipalities which had hoped that it would 
recommend further sources of municipal revenue. Indeed, the committee 
recommended quite the opposite, stating that white municipalities needed no 
further sources of revenue, and turning its attention instead to the 
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financial problems facing the then emerging Black Local Authorities (BLAs) 
and to coloured and Indian local authorities. The Committee argued that, as 
these black areas had no substantial revenue base of their own, a system 
would have to be developed whereby their incomes could be augmented by 
transfer payments from the part of a municipal complex that had substantial 
revenue potential in the form of an industrial or central business district 
(CBD) area. 
This proposal caused a furore among organised local government, and was 
strongly opposed by the United Municipal Executive - the top body 
representing municipal government in South Africa - and the proposal of 
transfer payments from affluent white industrial and CBDs was temporarily 
dropped. 
Reaction against the Browne Committee and agitation for the government to 
find extra and increased sources of revenue for local authorities continued 
among organised local government, resulting ultimately in the establishment 
of the Croeser 'Working Group' in 1980. 
The -main purpose of the Croeser Committee, since restyled into the Permanent 
Finance Liaison Committee, was to investigate all forms of local and regional 
government financing. When its report was tabled in Parliament in 1983, it 
accepted the municipal authorities' argument for new sources of municipal 
revenue. However, the Croeser working group also recognised that all races 
should have their own fully-fledged forms of local government, for which 
proper and adequate sources of finance would be required. Importantly, it 
recognised the need for transfer payments from wealthy white areas to less 
affluent African, Indian and coloured urban residential areas. Croeser 
identified that all local authorities, again particularly the BLAs, did not 
have sufficient revenue bases; especially ones with a built-in growth factor 
- something which white municipalities had been clamouring for, for some 
time. 
To this end the Croeser working group suggested that three new forms of taxes 
at the local/regional level should be introduced, so as to provide for the 
upgrading of black areas and to provide for a tax/service-levy/rate structure 
that could be tied to fluctuations in the economy; the taxes suggested were 
the payroll, the turnover and the investment taxes - the latter was 
temporarily abandoned and referred to the Margo Commission of Inquiry into 
South African tax structures. 
Croeser suggested that the taxes would be used to: 
e provide infrastructure within local authority areas 
• financially assist with the transport needs of particular areas, and 
9 provide the necessary funds for the training of personnel required to run 
local government structures (SAIRR 1984: p154). 
The Devolution Solution 
At the same time, the central government had to extend its national 
constitutional initiatives down to the local level; the state was becoming 
increasingly overstressed by the demands of the myriad administrative 
functions, such as housing and transport services, which it had assumed over 
the years. 
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Devolution of some of these functions to regional level, within the 
parameters of centralised structures of authority and the rigid maintenance 
of the policy of separate development, had become imperative. 
The idea was mooted for a body to be established which would be able to 
collect income in an economic zone, which could be redistributed for the 
development of infrastructure and services in underdeveloped black areas. The 
objective would be the devolution of functions such as road-making or water 
and electricity supplies, and the creation of revenue sources to enable the 
various regions to upgrade their infrastructures. 
Of course, this idea was not practicable in areas lacking sufficient economic 
activity to provide a tax base from which the income could be generated. The 
linking of economically powerful and weaker areas into regions, within which 
revenue could be redistributed for the upgrading of infrastructure in the 
latter, provided the solution by which the government's objectives, at least 
theoretically, could be achieved. 
The RSC Act may thus be seen as a response to a variety of needs at both 
central and local government levels: 
§ to provide additional sources of revenue for local authorities 
• to finance the upgrading of services and infrastructure in deprived black 
areas 
§ to provide an adequate source of revenue for these local authorities that 
would be able to keep pace with fluctuations in the economy 
§ to devolve certain cumbersome functions from the central government, and 
§ to attempt to resolve the legitimacy crisis facing black local authority 
structures by allowing the communities they represent increased participation 
in local government. 
The RSC system can work well in metropolitan areas which have sufficient 
economic activity to provide an adequate tax base for raising revenue, but in 
the less economically developed regions, eg rural areas, other financing 
solutions will be required. 
New Forms of Administration 
Functions 
As a result, South African municipalities have been presented with a system 
in which a local authority, presently being run by a single municipality, 
could have four 'own affairs' municipalities running it, one for each race 
group, as far as the provision of certain services is concerned. Stretching 
across all four, and in some way representing all of them, would then be the 
RSC, responsible for what the Act calls 'regional functions'. Whereas before, 
for example in Durban, the white residents had had complete control over 
certain services for the whole of the Durban Functional Region, residents in 
the African, coloured and Indian areas would now have a say in the provision 
of these services. 
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Schedule 2 of the Act lays down the functions which may eventually be taken 
out of municipal hands and given to the RSCs to perform. The RSCs are to 
handle bulk water supply, bulk electricity supply, sewerage purification, 
land use planning in the broad sense, major roads and stormwater drains, in 
short all services which are of common use to the region, the so-called 
'general affairs'. The various racial municipalities will then be responsible 
for the remaining functions. 
There is, however, the so-called 'Durban clause' in the Act, which states 
that with the permission of the Administrator certain municipalities may 
retail a certain number of services meant for regional distribution. This in 
practice means that the very large municipalities, such as Durban, Cape Town, 
Johannesburg etc, could supply retail electricity, water and sewerage 
services. Bulk services can also be supplied by existing local authorities as 
agents of the RSCs. 
The delineation of the boundaries of these regional areas and the 
determination of the functions of each RSC will ultimately be decided by the 
Administrator concerned, after extensive consultation to ensure acceptance by 
all of the representative bodies in the area. The extent of the devolution of 
functions from the central government to the regional level is obviously a 
major question mark hanging over the new system. We have yet to see how all 
the talk of devolution is expressed in practice. 
Sources of Revenue 
All this, of course, has direct financial implications: for the existing 
municipal councils, who in many cases will lose a number of functions and 
have to surrender unilateral control over others; for the new regional 
bodies, the question of the source of whose revenue is paramount, as they 
will not be able to levy rates, as a normal municipality can. 
Rates will continue to be levied by the local municipalities, but for a 
lesser range of functions. (This was not provided for in the Act but 
originally appeared in the draft Bill.) 
The need for a source of revenue for the RSCs is obvious, if they are to 
provide non-remunerative services on a regional basis. And it is hardly 
surprising that the new source of revenue envisaged, in the form of 
additional taxation, has met with hostile reactions from the press, commerce 
and industry. However, the total of taxation levied is only influenced if 
additional expenditures are incurred as opposed to being transferred from the 
state and municipalities. In this regard, apart from a small additional 
expenditure on administration (if the agency system of supplying regional 
services is used), the only additional funding will be the cost of upgrading 
services in the poorer areas of the region. This is surely an essential 
expenditure at this stage. 
Representation 
The maintenance of the residential separation enforced by the Group Areas Act 
and associated regulations automatically presents the problem of 
representation for any regional body which crosses racial lines. Numerical 
preponderance is, in the South African situation, almost always inversely 
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related to financial strength; the often overcrowded black urban areas being 
poor and the financially muscular white areas lacking sufficient population 
to allow a democratic voting arrangement. 
In addition, the presence of fragmented 'foreign' states within the country's 
borders has necessitated some peculiar legislative footwork in order to allow 
a regional council to incorporate part of another country if that country 
should so wish. Thus the Pretoria metropolitan area is able, by virtue of a 
clause in the Act, to enter into an arrangement with the Bophuthatswana 
government to include an urban area within the independent homeland into a 
South African RSC, with the permission, of course, of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 
In Durban, the interdependence of the city with those areas of KwaZulu which 
adjoin it and where a large part of its working population live, is widely 
accepted. Seats are available on the RSC, with the Administrator's 
permission, for a body representing people outside the municipal areas but 
within the region, even where there is no local government system in 
operation. 
Conclusion 
It is clear, then, that the introduction of the new system is beleaguered 
with complications, both conceptually and in its implementation. It has been 
developed, as outlined above, in order to solve some of the serious problems 
facing the government, but whether these aims will be achieved, and at what 
cost to whom, remains to be seen. There can be no doubt, however, that the 
motivation for the establishment of the RSC system has been primarily 
political, and as a result a number of practical issues facing government at 
the local level have had to take second place, or be partially resolved by 
compromise solutions which will be severely tested during the period of 
implementation. 
The implementation of the new system: the demarcation of areas, the 
delineation of functions, the execution of the new taxation systems, the 
formation of the RSCs and the formulation of their modus operandi, are the 
immediate problems which have to be faced. It will be only a matter of time, 
however, before the crucial issue of legitimacy and the acceptance or 
rejection by black communities of the new structures usurps the front seat 
presently occupied by practical considerations. 
The system at least recognises the need for a full multiracial regional body 
in the governmental structure, which is, in respect of the services it is 
supposed to provide, a unitary body, able to exercise powers similar to those 
of white South African local governments, and could be used on an agency 
basis for the further devolution of authority and responsibility in the 
course of time. 
Source 
South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Race Relations Survey 1984. 
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4 F I N A N C I A L I M P L I C A T I O N S O F T H E C R O E S E R T A X P A C K A G E 
A Critical Analysis of the Proposals for the Financing of RSCs 
By David Solomon of the Department of Business Administration, 
University of the Witwatersrand 
The financial implications of the new Regional Services Councils (RSC) Act are not 
easy to measure. The so-called 'Croeser Proposals' presented by the Permanent 
Finance Liaison Committee headed by the Deputy-Director General of Finance, 
Gerhard Croeser, seek to create new sources of revenue for regional government 
through the introduction of two new forms of taxation: a payroll tax and a turnover tax. 
In an interview with the Financial Mail (14/6/84), Croeser stated that these taxes would 
'in the first instance be paid by businesses and employers', and that the money would 
be used for 'a redistribution of some of the revenue to where the need is greatest'. This 
is in line with the government's concern that the private sector should supplement state 
expenditure on services, through 'an indirect form of transfer' of funds to the poorer 
local authorities. 
David Solomon argues that while these taxes may 'in the first instance' be paid by 
business, their ultimate effects will undoubtedly be felt by the man in the street, 
particularly by workers, since they constitute the segment of the economy least able to 
adapt to the new environment. 
Solomon evaluates the proposed new taxes in terms of the criteria of 'good taxation', ie 
that it should be productive, easy to collect, efficient, and fair in relation to the services 
which the taxpayer consumes. Taken singly, the proposed turnover and payroll taxes 
answer some of these requirements, but together their combined effect may arguably 
endanger the sustained growth of the metropolitan centres and, ultimately, increase 
poverty among already struggling sectors of the urban population. 
Beneath the government's stated intention to provide revenue at the local and regional 
levels, argues Solomon, lies another stratum of intervention. The new taxation methods 
may be constituted as punitive measures, designed to encourage economic 
development outside of the metropolitan areas by the creation of disincentives to 
investment in the cities. 
If this is indeed the case, then the cities should reject this initiative, which is not in their 
interest, and push instead for the removal of artificial restrictions which impede urban 
development in favour of the government's ideologically-based decentralisation 
policies. For it is arguably the maintenance of Group Areas and associated legislation 
which continues to dictate the government's social and economic policies at both the 
national and regional level, effectively putting a brake on the integrated metropolitan 
development which could, from another point of view, make a major impact in the 
elimination of the social and economic inequality through economic growth and the 
creation of job opportunities. 
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The Croeser Proposals 
At the spearhead of the current government initiatives aimed at considering 
the financial aspects of regional reform is the 'Working Group', headed by 
Gerhard Croeser, Deputy Director-General of Finance, and consisting of 
representatives from the four Provincial Administrations, the United 
Municipal Executive, the Department of Finance, the office of the State 
President and the Department of Development Aid. 
The Croeser Working Group, which thus far has endorsed and promoted the 
policy of RSCs, has actively sought the devolution of redistributive 
activities of local authorities and the centralisation of 'hard' local 
services upwards from municipal authorities to the RSCs. By 'hard' functions, 
the government has in mind activities such as the bulk water supply, 
electricity supply, sewerage and drainage etc. 
The Working Group's strongest proposals concern new sources of revenue for 
local authorities: a payroll tax and a turnover tax, while a tax on 
productive assets was also proposed, but has been shelved for reasons which 
will be given below. These taxes are new in South Africa, and together, may 
have very unfortunate economic effects. 
Productive Assets Tax 
The first element in the Croeser package was to have been the extension of 
the property tax or 'rate' on fixed property into the field of movable assets 
owned by firms (for example, items like the production equipment of a 
business) within the metropolitan area. The shortcoming of this tax is that 
the assets would indeed move, shifting the tax from its legal base onto 
capital in general in the economy, or onto whatever factors are immobile with 
respect to the metropolitan area. Labour which cannot relocate as easily will 
find itself working with a reduced capital stock and would earn a lower wage; 
land prices would fall, and business activity would be reduced. These ill 
effects could only be avoided by levying the tax on all productive assets in 
the economy, metropolitan-based or not. At the insistence of the Association 
of Chambers of Commerce, the proposal for this type of taxation was dropped, 
and now seems to have been deflected onto the agenda of the Margo Commission 
investigating taxing structures in South Africa. 
Payroll Tax 
South Africans have thus far encountered this type of taxation only in the 
form of the social security deductions from wages - the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) contribution. Although collected by the employer, the 
burden of the payroll tax will in the final analysis fall entirely on the 
worker. In fact, the amount paid by the worker may be even larger than the 
proportion deducted from his wage, as the employer/producer is able to pass 
some of the tax on to the consumer. 
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Although Section 12 (7) of the RSC Act specifically states that payroll taxes 
may not be recovered by any employer or vendor by either adding them on as a 
separate item to prices or tariffs or by deducting them from the wages or 
salaries paid, the taxes will ultimately fall on both the consumer and the 
worker. Government officials have claimed that the loss to employers will not 
be so great since a further clause in the Act, Section 12 (8), allows 
business to regard payroll taxes as a deductable business expense, claiming 
that in effect the government will be footing half the bill as it will be 
relinquishing taxes. However, no matter what government officials claim, 
since the government will only be giving partial tax relief, the remainder 
will be paid by consumers and workers. 
Until now, shifting has not proved to be a particular problem in South 
Africa, since the benefits of the social security (UIF) accrue directly to 
the worker in direct proportion to the amount paid and the tax is, in effect, 
a compulsory check-off facility in payment for a social security benefit' 
received. 
The degree to which the tax falls on workers should theoretically depend on 
their willingness and ability to respond to the lower after-tax wage, by 
witholding labour altogether or by supplying it in a non-taxing jurisdiction. 
In the South African environment of statutory job immobility, however, the 
law will tend to cause the tax to be borne by workers, rather than employers 
or consumers, since African labour will not be able to move to other 
geographic areas. Compounding this tendency is the proposal that these taxes 
be collected on a metropolitan-wide basis. This makes the withdrawal of 
labour to a non-taxing jurisdiction much more difficult, although not 
impossible. Theory suggests that employment in the metropolitan areas will 
fall as a result of a reduction in real after-tax urban wages. 
Also affected will be unemployment which, paradoxically, will fall as a 
result of a reduction in the urban-rural wage differential. Urban influx will 
be partially abated, along with the attendant ills of unemployment, squatting 
and overcrowding. The payroll tax need not discourage business in the 
metropolitan areas, since the wage before taxes will be unaffected. 
Reductions in employment will be compensated for by increases in other inputs 
to the production process, such as capital or land. 
In some respects the payroll tax meets the criteria for good taxation. It 
will be productive and cheap to collect, and its yield will increase in 
reasonable proportion with the demands made on it. The other criteria for 
evaluating taxes are, however, not met. It is not fair, by any definition of 
that term. Workers are neither blessed with an unusual 'ability to pay', nor 
do they benefit in proportion to the sacrifice made. The tax is not 
efficient, nor is it certain, since it can be avoided by professionals, the 
self-employed, partnerships, sole proprietors and many other categories of 
working people. Since these categories of non-wage income earners also 




It is further proposed that a tax on the turnover of productive 
establishments be levied in place of the existing trade licences. It is 
envisaged, however, that this tax be a productive one, unlike the licence, 
which is insignificant in its yield. 
The shortcomings are clear. By taxing the same commodity repeatedly as it 
moves through the productive process, a tax is collected which is based on a 
multiple of Gross National Product (GNP). This multiple is, however, not the 
same for each commodity, nor are firms at all uniform in the relationship 
between income and turnover. Firms which enjoy a high proportion between 
their profit and turnover, such as manufacturers of paper, will pay a smaller 
proportionate tax than those whose profits to turnover ratio is low, such as 
clothing and furniture manufacturer's. 
The motor industry, which has possibly the lowest profit to turnover ratio of 
all South African industry, will pay as much as four times as great a 
proportion of tax as it earns as profits. A tax rate as low as two percent 
could entirely wipe out motor industry profits. The devastating effects need 
hardly be elaborated. This kind of arbitrary discrimination can have a very 
distorting effect on the development of industry. 
An equally serious consequence of the turnover tax is the tendency for firms 
to integrate vertically, by the joining of suppliers and customers to shorten 
the chain of production, each link of which is liable to a tax. This further 
concentration of South African industry would be of very questionable 
desirability. The tax also has a strong disincentive effect on efficient 
production. Firms which achieve cost reductions through economies of scale 
and pass them on to consumers through lower mark-ups, such as supermarkets, 
will be heavily penalised. Less efficient firms, with high mark-up, low 
turnover will be taxed more lightly. The general economic effects of turnover 
taxes could be very severe for both city-based firms and consumers. Because 
many manufacturing businesses have competitors outside the metropolitan 
regions who will not be liable for the new tax, they do not have the 
opportunity to 'pass on' these taxes to comsumers. In general, the tax 
constitutes a potentially severe stick with which to drive consumers and 
producers out of the city and into the neighbouring rural districts (Business 
Day 29/5/85). 
Over time, these distortions on the structure and organisation of industry 
should result in capital and labour movements which ultimately will bring 
after-tax returns back to equality across industries and regions. The results 
will be passing on of the tax to consumers, both local and national. 
The turnover tax is thus unfair, in that the amount paid is unrelated to 
benefit received and to ability to pay. It is inefficient and uncertain. 
Collection is likely to be cheap and easy, as long as the base includes only 
firms which are obliged to keep records. The tax will be productive at a low 
rate. The shortcomings of this tax compound those of the payroll tax, making 
the package even more problematic than each tax would be individually. 
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Conclusion 
The combined effect of these taxes is clearly to encourage development 
outside of the metropolitan areas, very much in accordance with the resolve 
of the 'Good Hope Conference' of 1982. Contrary to the spirit of that 
occasion, on which the then Prime Minister PW Botha promised to employ 
carrots, not sticks, these measures constitute very severely punitive 
measures to achieve what appears to be the objective. The pressures fall on 
the sections of the community which are under most stress: the African, 
coloured and Indian workers. They are least able to adapt to the new 
environment by migrating or diversifying. Accordingly, they bear the brunt of 
the taxes, without enjoying commensurate benefits of the spending thus 
financed. 
If the local government environment were such that effective competition 
prevailed, the precise nature of the taxes imposed would not matter. All 
would finally have their incidence on the one immobile factor, land. 
Competition would keep them as low as possible and benefits as high as 
possible. The metropolitanisation of the big cities changes this picture by 
reducing the potential to be mobile and inhibiting competition. This process 
will make it possible for labour to bear a great deal of the taxes levied 
together with land and immobile categories of capital. In addition, local 
bureaucracies, having been given wider scope for action and with democratic 
restraints on them watered down, will be able, if so inclined, to expand 
their activities beyond efficient limits. 
It is quite clear that the Croeser Working Group proposals are nothing more 
than the implementation of the decentralisation policies initiated at the 
Good Hope Conference in 1982, which have as an express objective the 
enhancement of the rural growth points at the direct expense of the large 
cities. They represent a change in emphasis from providing incentives in the 
rural areas to creating disincentives in the cities. In their own interests, 
the cities should reject this initiative and the associated metropolitan 
Regional Services Councils. The advantages that growing cities can bring to 
South Africa, as a whole, in terms of job opportunities and economic growth, 
are very considerable. 
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5 IS IT T O O L A T E FOR B L A C K L O C A L A U T H O R I T I E S ? 
By Elizabeth Lear of the Department of Political Studies, 
University of Cape Town 
Black Local Authorities are widely regarded by African communities as extensions of 
apartheid, and their councillors and administrative officials as agents of the South 
African government. The violence directed towards these officials is a clear indicator 
that Black Local Authorities have in many areas suffered a serious, if not total, collapse 
of credibility among the communities which they are supposed to serve. 
Can this tendency be reversed? Elizabeth Lear in a paper written a few months ago but 
still relevant, argues that two primary reasons underlie the failure of the Black Local 
Authority (BLA) system, which unless positively counteracted, will ensure that any 
authority or credibility which these bodies may still have will disintegrate under the 
force of active political opposition. 
Firstly the black municipal government system, despite changes in nomenclature (from 
Urban Bantu Councils to Community Councils to Black Local Authorities) has 
remained firmly under the control of the Department of Co-operation and 
Development, now the Department of Development Aid. One of the prime functions of 
this Department is, through the agency of its Development Boards, the enforcement of 
the pass laws and influx control regulations. 
Secondly, their lack of political independence is matched by their financial inadequacy. 
They are unable to provide the basic infrastructure and services so desperately needed 
by African communities, or to attract skilled, qualified personnel. As a result, they have' 
been forced to second into their local systems administrative officials from the 
Department of Co-operation and Development's Development Boards. In this way the 
impression that they are without independent authority and subject to direct 
government control has been reinforced. 
In terms of the Regional Services Councils Act, African communities are to obtain 
'redistributed wealth' for the upgrading of municipal government infrastructures and 
services. But even if it works in practice, this process will take a long time; Mr Chris 
Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, predicts that it will be 
twenty, years before Regional Services Councils (RSCs) are in a position to provide the 
necessary basic services. The crisis of legitimacy presently facing all black municipal 
authorities, particularly African Town and Village Councils, prohibits so long term a 
view. 
Lear postulates that unless these bodies are allowed to operate normally alongside 
coloured, Indian and white local authorities under the umbrella of the new RSCs, there 
is little chance that they will regain sufficient credibility to be able to operate effectively 
at all. 
She further submits that, to overcome the lack of skilled manpower, Black Local 
Authorities should join with white municipalities to form a single non-racial local 
government structure, and that all local authorities be amalgamated into an integrated 
body, with voting based either on community numbers, property valuations per 
community, or a compromise of both. 
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Assessing the Damage 
The most disconcerting aspect of the present violence in black townships is 
that few clear answers are evident as to its actual origins. Nevertheless, 
the attitudes and perceptions of African communities towards local government 
structures have been a recurring theme. Councillors and officials of the 34 
African town councils established under the Black Local Authorities Act No 
102 of 1982, have found themselves in the invidious position of being viewed 
by their communities as agents of the apartheid system, while also being 
easily accessible targets for the expression of violent political action. The 
logic behind these acts of reprisal has been reinforced by the fact that very 
often white Development Board officials have been the interface between Black 
Local Authorities (BLAs) and their communities, particularly in the sensitive 
area of housing control and allocation, the main activity of most local 
authorities. 
This has happened despite the intention of the government in setting up the 
B lAs, which was to diffuse urban black tensions and anger. -The involvement of 
the Development Boards was supposed to be minimised by the establishment of 
BLAs, and it was understood that the BLAs would phase out Board involvement 
in African municipal government in favour of institutions that would be 
controlled by Africans. According to senior Development Board official Dr PJ 
Riekert: 
'These local authorities will serve to defuse pent-up frustrations and 
grievances against administration from Pretoria. Local authorities will 
affect the daily existence of these Black people more directly and more 
intimately than the more removed activities of the central government' 
(Bekker and Humphries 1985: p111/112). 
Financing Without Finance 
Widespread rent boycotts and the refusal to pay increased rates and service 
levies indicate, over and above the political violence, the lack of 
confidence in local authority structures by urban African communities. Behind 
the government's explicit intention that Town and Village Councils must 
become as financially self-sufficient as possible lies the implicit 
assumption that African communities should contribute to their own upkeep. 
But these institutions are devoid of community support and are subject even 
to outright antagonism. As a result of sustained civil unrest and rioting 
during 1984/85, few of them have been able to function properly, particularly 
in the Eastern Cape and Pretoria-Witwatersrand and Vereeniging areas. 
The raising of rents and service charges is however one of the few ways in 
which Black Local Authorities can raise revenue. Operating under deficits 
ever since the Administration Boards (now called Development Boards) took 
over their financing from white municipalities in 1973, Town and Village 
Councils which achieved Local Authority status under the 1982 Act took over 
the monetary deficits accumulated in their previous incarnation as the old 
Community Councils (Sunday Tribune 15/4/84). 
Financially crippled from birth by this inherited deficit, BLAs have striven 
to gain control of revenue-raising activities such as bottle stores and 
beerhalls, most of which still remain in Development Board hands. 
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The Department of Finance, aware of their poverty, has sought to dissuade 
black municipalities from launching expensive projects: a ten percent 
increase is the maximum allowed each year on the previous year's budget. This 
limit can only be exceeded if more than half of a project's cost comprises 
pay for semi-skilled or unskilled labour, if the project alleviates 
unemployment, or if it is entirely financed by the Local Authority (Financial 
Mail 22/2/85). 
Inadequate Compensation 
Africans remain excluded from the new constitution's first tier of 
government; they must turn to the homelands for their affairs of state. The 
Black Local Authority system appears to be officially perceived as some kind 
of compensation for this state of affairs. 
However, the government placed BLAs under the control of the Department of 
Co-operation and Development, now the Department of Development Aid, and 
forced them to liaise with the predominantly white-staffed Development 
Boards, which still control most of their revenue-raising activities. More 
recent changes have brought BLAs under the Department of Constitutional 
Development and Planning (see concluding chapter). In terms of the 
legislation, a Director of Local Government - appointed by the Minister -
will.have a final say over the operation of BLAs in certain respects which 
include: 
0 the control of the size of councils and their dates for elections; 
s the power to dissolve a council when it is decided that it no longer need 
exi st; 
s the authority to appoint staff to fill vacancies if there are no elections 
(SAIRR 1983: p254). 
Finally, governmental power is firmly entrenched in that the Minister has the 
power to remove Council members from office or dissolve a Council if steps 
ordered by him to set right unsound finances are not taken. 
It has been argued that the wide Ministerial discretion for interference in 
Council affairs can be explained in two ways: either the Department believes 
that African officials are not competent enough and lack the necessary 
expertise to run local government structures and thus there is a need for 
white checks and balances; or the Department believes that the BLAs could 
become political platforms for discontent directed at the state (Bekker and 
Humphries 1984: p113). 
By placing the Councils under the control of the Department of Development 
Aid, and allowing the predominantly white-staffed Development Boards to 
retain control of their most important functions, the government not only 
succeeded in emasculating the BLAs but also allowed the scorn of the African 
communities to be poured upon these impotent institutions. Reports of 
infighting between BLAs and Development Board officials (Financial Mail 
22/2/85), while they do indicate some level of activity by the former, have 
done nothing to lend credibility or raise community confidence; nor have 
revelations to the effect that more than R700 000 a year was paid by BLAs in 
1984 for the part-time services of 77 white Development Board staff members 
(The Star 25/3/84). 
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New government initiatives do appear to contain an attempt to remedy the 
situation, by allowing for the inclusion of representation from BLAs on the 
Council of the Coordination of Local Government Affairs, and they will also 
have representation on the RSCs (Rand Daily Mail 11/10/84). These two 
measures, with their revenue-raising functions, could make some headway in 
providing African municipal structures with the ability to provide limited 
infrastructure and services to their communities. However, the principle of 
'minimum service for all' will take a long time to be realised in practice. 
The Question of Land 
While BLAs are not precluded from developing housing on their own land, it is 
the Development Boards which have been given a major new function in the 
development of African housing. It is not clear from either the Black Local 
Authorities Act or the more recent Black Communities Act of 1984, however, 
which of these bodies is ultimately responsible for the-sensitive task of 
allocating state-owned housing. For the newly established Town and Village 
Councils with Local Authority status, control of land in their own areas is 
an important issue: they want to negotiate directly with interested parties 
in their communities, rather than be subject to the decisions of Development 
Board officials. 
Recommendations 
For BLAs to gain at least minimal acceptance by their communities, it is 
submitted that positive developments in three primary areas are necessary: 
(a) Finances: Substantial revenue must be voted by the RSCs for the 
development of local infrastructure and services in African communities. 
(b) Housing: The allocation of land within BLA areas, the relocation of 
squatters, the collection of rents from existing state-owned housing, the 
allocation of these dwellings and their servicing, the determination of 
housing needs and the development of solutions thereto - in fact all 
functions which would normally fall under the aegis of a local authority -
must be removed from Development Board control and handed over to the BLAs. 
(c) Structure: BLAs must be removed from their present position under the 
Department of Development Aid and placed under the auspices of the RSCs 
alongside the coloured, Indian and white municipal authorities. (This move 
has subsequently occurred - see concluding chapter.) 
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Conclusions 
The only viable long-term solution appears to be the establishment of 
multiracial governments at local level, the present white local government 
infrastructure providing the base into which the authorities governing all 
race groups are incorporated. Otherwise, there is bound to be massive 
infrastructural duplication. If attempts are made to apply the 'minimum 
services' ethic in African communities at local and regional levels, pressure 
would be placed on the government to provide the same for coloured and Indian 
c-ommunities. The duplication of hospitals, ambulances, health clinics etc is 
but one example. 
Furthermore, the source of funds to support such a system is at present 
confined to a relatively small pool of individuals and businesses in each 
area, while the vast majority of unskilled and unemployed people most in need 
of support are in the impoverished Indian, coloured and African communities. 
Where community boundaries are drawn according to race, it is inevitable that 
the productive potential of the poorer communities will be incapable of 
meeting community needs, while the more affluent will be increasingly 
stripped of earnings via central, regional and local government taxes. 
Representation 
While multiracial local government structures would solve the problem of 
infrastructure duplication, allowing the channelling of the funds thus saved 
into further development, there is no doubt that the issue of representation 
on such multiracial structures would be a source of conflict. 
A compromise between the poles of representation according to property 
valuation and representation according to community numbers could, however, 
be worked out, so that financial contribution is fairly balanced against 
community need. 
It is submitted that the development of multiracial local government is the 
only way in which the historical powerlessness of Black Local Authorities can 
be overcome, allowing the establishment of structures capable of the 
provision of adequate services and enjoying the credibility and cooperation 
of the communities which they should be designed to serve. Local government 
institutions should, after all, be seen as mechanisms for the provisions of 
essential services, rather than politically entrenched and embattled agencies 
of the ruling party in government. 
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6 D E V O L U T I O N W I T H O U T P O W E R 
Regional Services Councils and the Western Cape 
By Robert Cameron of the Department of Political Studies, 
University of Cape Town 
Centralisation of power and authority has been a historical feature of government by 
the National Party in South Africa. In order to ensure the uniform application of its 
racial policies, the government has found it necessary to exercise an overriding 
authority over local government, particularly where local or municipal bodies have 
been reluctant to enforce apartheid laws. 
The Cape Town City Council (CCC) is a case in point, where attempts to obstruct or 
resist certain laws and regulations racial in character have resulted in the whittling 
away of executive autonomy from the CCC. 
Cameron analyses the recent swing towards the concepts of devolution of power and 
decentralisation of authority, contained inter alia in the Regional Services Councils 
(RSC) Act, in the light of the government's historically centralist tendencies. He points 
out that the new approach is flawed by an inherent contradiction:'the state wishes to 
decentralise administrative responsibility and hand over limited power to local 
authorities, but only within the rigid framework of the Group Areas Act and other racial 
legislation. 
The maintenance of uniform policies largely rejected by the communities to be 
governed is likely to be threatened by the development of representative government at 
local level. For this reason, the government seeks to limit power at the local level to 
institutions such as Town and Village Councils or Management Committees, which lack 
credibility among the communities they are supposed to represent. 
Cameron shows, in the case of the Western Cape, that the RSCs are likely to be faced 
with the same legitimacy crisis which has in the past faced the coloured Management 
Committees and African Community Councils. 
The genuine devolution of power implies the growth and development of independent 
power centres at local level, threatening the uniform maintenance of the government's 
policies, in particular those which are widely rejected among the African, Indian and 
coloured communities. 
The partial or cosmetic decentralisation of responsibility without power has been 
shown to be, in the South African context, a recipe for rejection and outright political 
opposition. 
This contradiction will remain at the heart of the new regional government 
dispensation, so long as racial criteria are entrenched in the structures of government. 
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Constitutional Development and Planning Minister Chris Heunis, speaking in 
Parliament in July 1984, stated that 'the maximum devolution of powers and 
decentralisation of administration to the local level of government' (Hansard 
July 1984) was to be considered one of the fundamental principles of the new 
local government dispensation. A year earlier, at the same venue, he had said 
that the government 'must take steps to ensure that it retains ways and means 
of ensuring that its policies are applied throughout' (Hansard June 1983). 
These two statements contain the essence of the dilemma facing the government 
in the formulation of its plans for constitutional reform at the local level: 
how to devolve power while ensuring uniformity of policy. The 'devolution of 
powers', which implies the conferment of executive or rule-making powers to 
formally constituted local authorities (Vosloo et al 1974: p10), and 
'decentralisation of administration' where, due to practical considerations, 
certain functions are devolved from central government to a local 
administrative agency, are in fact two different processes: it has been 
argued that the recent local government legislation embodies the second 
principle but not the first. 
This paper undertakes to examine the contradiction inherent in the 
government's policy, with reference to the proposed RSCs, taking the greater 
Cape Town area as an example. 
Centralisation vs Decentralisation 
'Local authorities are the agents of the state with respect to the execution 
of policy.' Dr H F Verwoerd (Slabbert & Welsh 1979: p87) 
Neither the South African Act of 1909 nor the 1961 Constitution made 
reference of the right of local government to exist: local authorities 
functioned in terms of the doctrine of ultra vires, viz that they could only 
perform those services specifically authorised by statute (Craythorne 1983). 
Over the years, the lack of constitutional safeguards has resulted in the 
powers of local authorities being whittled away by both the state and 
provincial government, particularly where the implementation of the 
government's racial policies is concerned. The state, in order to preempt 
obstructionism of apartheid laws by local authorities, took over the 
administration of blacks in urban areas, and through the Group Areas Act 
gained direct control of the residential patterns of local authorities. 
The 1983 constitutional legislation again did not embody local government, 
although mention was made in the schedule to the Act that local government 
would be an 'own affair' subject to the provisions of any general law 
relating thereto. Like its companion Acts, the Promotion of Local Government 
Affairs Act (1983) and its amendments in 1984 and 1985 and the Remuneration 




The RSC Act gives the Council mandatory powers over those local authorities 
which fall under it, and makes provision for the transfer to the Council of 
more than twenty functions previously performed by local authorities. 
Indirectly elected, the Council is not accountable to the general public, and 
rather than being extensions of local authorities, as government spokesmen 
claim, the RSCs are patently an extra tier of government with mandatory 
executive and taxing powers over local authorities. 
Conflict of Interests 
Local authorities tend rightly to regard themselves as accountable to their 
ratepayers rather than to the government of the day; their close access to 
the citizens in their jurisdiction enables them to identify and respond to 
community needs more appropriately than government or the civil servants 
which carry out its policies. Hence the provision contained in the Act for 
civil servants to be transferred to the RSCs is likely to lead to a conflict 
of interests with local authorities, despite government argument that local 
authorities should be viewed as a subsection of the civil service because 
they are ultimately financed by the taxpayer. While there is some truth in 
this argument, manning the RSCs with civil servants can hardly be construed 
as being conducive to the devolution of power. 
Ministerial Discretion 
It is likely, given the contentious issue of the redistribution of funds and 
resources among racial primary local authorities, that the Appeal Board 
provided in Section 11 of the Act will be the scene of lively activity. 
The criteria governing items which may be lodged for appeal in terms of 
Section 11 (4) of the Act are vague and wide reaching, giving much scope for 
appeal. It is foreseen that the Administrator and various ministers who 
comprise the Appeal Board will have their hands full attempting to tie the 
vagaries of conflicting interests into the corset of the Act. No meaningful 
devolution is likely to occur in a situation where unfettered ministerial 
discretion dictates the application of the law. 
Manifest Contradiction 
The question is, then, why the state is professing to be devolving power 
while the evidence rather strongly suggests the contrary. 
The answer lies, it is submitted, to embody the government's policy of self-
determination at the local level to enable coloured and Indian local 
authorities to have full control over certain decisionmaking processes at 
this level. This restructuring is a natural consequence of the 1983 
constitution which made provision for 'own affairs' at the local level. 
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Further, the politicisation of a number of functions which should be either 
local government or free-enterprise domains, but which have come under the 
umbrella of state control, has also been responsible. The Deputy Governor of 
the Reserve Bank, Jan Lombard, has argued forcibly that in order to maintain 
its racial laws, the state has been forced to become all pervasive in a 
number of areas of life which should not be its responsibi1ity at all. These 
areas have become increasingly politicised: unrest and social'disorganisation 
are stressing the state's resources while black communities simultaneously 
demand increased physical and social expenditure. 
The devolution of administrative functions to the local level would not only 
relieve the central government financially, but would also transfer the site 
of conflict from the central to the local government arena, or as Minister 
Heunis puts it: 'we have to reduce the conflict areas on central level and 
bring than down to local level' (Hansard June 1984). 
But the embodiment of the principles of the devolution of power carries with, 
it obvious dangers for the government in power: it cannot afford to allow 
extra-parliamentary opposition forces to secure a power base at the level of 
local government, which could then be turned against the central state. 
Either government can allow the genuine devolution of power and face the 
prospect of the development of independent power centres at local level, or 
it can attempt to retain strong control over local authorities, ensuring a 
uniformity of policies and the application thereof. The attempt to do both is 
inherently contradictory, and can only result in a 'Catch 22' situation. 
The new local government legislation is testimony that the legislature has 
been unable to escape from this trap, making inevitable the confusion which 
lias attended the RSC Act since its promulgation. 
The Cape Town City Council: A Case Study 
Undoubtedly the hub of the Western Cape, the Cape Town City Council (CCC) is 
the logical prime focus of attention when viewing local government in this 
area. 
The CCC has traditionally considered itself to be the spiritual heir of the 
so-called 'Cape liberal tradition', and, its supporters would argue, a 
constant thorn in the flesh of the Nationalist government whose legislative 
activities have dominated Cape Town's parliamentary buildings for the last 37 
years. Its policy is that all its ratepayers should be able to vote and be 
elected to the CCC on a common voters roll without discrimination, and on a 
number of important occasions it has resisted the implementation of racially 
based laws and regulations. 
Conflict between the CCC and the Nationalist-controlled Cape Provincial 
Administration (CPA) has resulted in the promulgation of a number of 
provincial Ordinances in recent years which have incrementally chipped away 
its powers, as well as those of other local authorities under the CPA, for 
example: 
• instructions from the Administrator to implement by-laws if unenforced by 
the CCC may be passed over for implementation by another body (Craythorne 
1980: pp257/258) 
• the Administrator has the power to reverse decisions taken by the Council 
in order to compel it to carry out his instructions (Argus 3/5/79) 
• the Council was deprived in 1981 of its exclusive right to appoint senior 
municipal staff by a CPA enactment, which gave the Administrator power to 
appoint the chairman of the Municipal Service Commission (the CCC's personnel 
body) (Cape Times 18/7/81) 
• in 1982 the CCC was warned against obstructing government plans to 
restructure the local government system and threatened with the removal of 
state funds and with legal action (ibid 26/10/81). 
Management Committees 
Voting rights at municipal level held by coloured people' in the Cape Province 
were removed by an amendment to a provincial Ordinance in 1971, effectively 
axing the six coloured members serving on the 34-seat CCC at that time. 
To replace the apartheid anomaly of a qualified franchise across the colour 
bar which had prevailed until 1971, the government decided that the racially 
defined Management Committees (MCs), created in the mid-1960s, should become 
the only structures which would be able to represent the coloured community. 
These bodies were only allowed to advise white local authorities in 
connection with the provision of services to their own areas. Although 
provided for, no upgrading of coloured MCs to autonomous local authority 
status has to date occurred. MCs have been rejected as a poor substitute by 
those whom they are intended to serve. 
Voter apathy has characterised the short history of these MCs. In the 1983 
elections, two of the four MCs which fall under the CCC had their members 
elected unopposed, with percentage polls of 11.98 percent and 1.81 percent in 
the other two districts represented (Argus 6/9/83). Allied to this is the 
fact that less than 50 percent of coloured people have ever bothered to 
register as municipal voters. 
Besides apathy towards these toothless bodies, the historical tradition of 
political non-collaboration (which has its roots in the Unity Movement) has 
led to a consistent boycotting of government-created structures by the 
coloured community. The Labour Party has been the only group to have 
significantly benefitted from these Committees: most Labour Party 
representatives have served on them, and a party maxim states the need to 
'keep a tight grip on the Management Committees to derive maximum political 
power from the system for the party' (Cape Times 24/6/85). 
Relations between the MCs and the CCC have been very strained ever since 
their formation in the mid-1960s, and after the CCC opposed the 
disenfranchisement of coloureds at the local level, refused to set up any 
such committees, thus forcing the CPA to do so. 
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The RSC in the Western Cape 
A great deal of ambiguity surrounds the setting up of RSCs for the region, 
targeted to begin functioning in the first quarter of 1986. Little clarity is 
evident with regard to issues such as the proposed rate of levies; state 
subsidisation of urban transport services; the exact functions for which the 
RSC will be responsible; or indeed whether there will be one or two RSCs for 
the Western Cape. 
Demarcation of the areas which fall under the Western Cape RSC, to be 
determined by a demarcation board established by the Government Affairs 
Amendment Act, will take place within the parameters of the Group Areas Act. 
The CCC, perceiving the establishment of the RSC to be a fait accompli, has 
tried hard to utilise the situation to its own advantage. They have made 
representations with regard to the demarcation of the area to fall under the 
RSC's jurisdiction, calling for inclusion of the Peninsula, Kuilsrivier and 
Brackenfel 1 in the greater Cape Town RSC (CCC 10/9/85) which would also 
include the African areas of Langa, Nyanga, Guguletu and New Crossroads (see 
map). 
Financial Implications 
In terms of the RSC Act, taxation will be levied on businesses in the region 
from 1st July 1986. The effect of these levies on a local economy, which even 
in the boom period of the early 1980s lagged behind the rest of the country, 
is a cause of concern in the Western Cape. 
Apart from the additional burden passed on to the consumer, the introduction 
of the RSC may financially weaken the CCC itself. The payroll levy on its 
18 000-strong workforce will cost the council, depending on the rate set, an 
estimated R1,7 million a year, in addition to an estimated R1,6 million lost 
to scrapped business licences, while the licensing of businesses for health 
and planning reasons may well cost the council a further R900 000 (Cape Times 
16/1/85). 
In order to balance its budget in future, the CCC might be forced to 
introduce substantial rate hikes, despite the government's acceptance of the 
United Municipal Executive's principle that after the implementation of RSCs 
no local authority should be worse off than before. 
Future Scenario 
The issue of coloured and African local authority representation on the RSC 
is a pressing question in the Western Cape, as the authority of both MC and 
the Labour Party is being eroded by active political opposition: attacks on 
the homes of Management Committee members and the widespread rejection of 
these bodies hashed to the postponement of their elections until 1988. 
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At their recent conference, the Association of Management Committees passed a 
motion giving the government until September 1986 to implement a common 
voters roll at municipal level, or be faced with a walkout by the MCs from 
the local government system. Likewise, the resignation of African community 
councillors is indicative of a similar situation in the African townships, 
and there is a strong likelihood that, unless their racial underpinnings are 
removed, RSCs will be given no more credence among the African communities 
than that presently not enjoyed by the Community Councils. 
Financially, the danger exists that RSCs will generate unrealistic 
expectations among the communities concerned for visible improvements in 
infrastructure and services. Were this situation to develop, thwarted 
expectations initially raised by the introduction of RSCs could result in the 
inflamation, rather than the dampening, of township unrest. 
After all, RSCs are not going to create new wealth - they will be redirecting 
existing wealth: the financing of massive infrastructure and development will 
ultimately be felt in the pocket of the man in the street. As the 
electrification programme in Soweto illustrated a few years ago, it is futile 
providing people with services which they cannot afford. 
Finally, their are definite limits to the redistributive potential of the 
RSCs, despite the Act's intention that infrastructure, services and 
facilities are to be provided where they are most needed: the government's 
constituency is after all not in the coloured and African townships where 
these needs are most urgent, but in the white areas whose reluctance to 
wholeheartedly support such transfer of funds is not hard to predict. 
Sources 
Cape Town City Council, 'Proposed Regional Services Council for the Cape 
Peninsula and Adjoining Areas', 10/9/85. 
Craythorne D, 'Metropolitan Local Government 1. Unpublished PHD Thesis, UCT 
1983. 
Craythorne D, 'Municipal Administration - A Handbook'. Cape Town Jutas 1980. 
Van Zyl Slabbert F, and Welsh D, 'South Africa's Options: Strategies for 
Sharing Power'. David Phillip, Cape Town 1979. 
Vosloo W B, Kotze D A, and Jeppe W 0, 'Local Government in Southern Africa'. H 
& R Academia, Cape Town 1974. 
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7 A D M I N I S T E R I N G S H A C K S E T T L E M E N T S 
Squatter Problems with Regional Services Councils 
By Clarissa Fourie, Research Officer at the Inkatha Institute 
The establishment of a Regional Services Council in the greater Durban region must of 
necessity take into account large informal shack settlements which surround the 
established metropolitan areas. In doing so, however, the new proposed regional 
government structures must recognise that the massive shack areas are presently 
administered both formally and informally by the central government, locally elected 
bodies, tribal authorities and Inkatha in any number of complex combinations, when it 
comes to choosing representatives from these areas to sit on the Regional Services 
Councils (RSCs). 
No simple formula for local government is likely to be adequate to encompass the 
widely differing structures which pertain in these areas. There is a real danger that, 
through the implementation of the proposed RSC in the greater Durban region, existing 
democratic structures and bodies could be ignored or even lost, without being replaced 
by more effective arrangements. 
Clarissa Fourie outlines some of the types of local government structures and 
relationships existing in the shack areas, illustrating how, in the absence of any 
effective formally structured administration, complicated relationships of authority and 
representation have developed over the years, according to specific local needs and 
political and economic resources of the various shack communities. 
It would appear that the difficulties posed by the variety of structures and arrangements 
existing in these shack areas have yet to be fully comprehended by those involved in 
the formulation of local government policy. The structuring of voting power on the 
greater Durban RSC will have to include representation from the nearly 1,5 million 
shack-dwellers. How this is to be achieved is a question it would be dangerous to 
ignore, particularly in view of the increasing political muscle exhibited by leaders in the 
shack areas since the outbreak of violence in the Durban area in August 1985.. 
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The area which is scheduled to fall under the Durban/Pinetown RSC is a 
varied one, comprising affluent white suburbs, large formal African, Indian 
and coloured townships and sprawling peri-urban shack settlements. Most of 
these shack areas have informal local government and administrative 
structures which do not conform to the present definition of a juristic body, 
which the RSC Act requires for participation in formal agreements and voting 
structures. This means that although the shack areas are the least developed 
and serviced areas in the greater Durban Functional Region (DFR), and in 
terms of the redistribution of income and expenditure from the rich to poorer 
areas to be undertaken by the RSCs, should receive great attention from the 
RSC, they would have no voting power on this body. This effectively means 
that the shack communities populations, a large proportion of the total 
Durban/Pinetown RSC population, will have no structured system through which 
they can lobby and effect direct representation. 
The implications of this could quite possibly be that the shack populations 
will lose, rather than gain any democratic structures and procedures at local 
government level with the creation of RSCs. An anomaly which contradicts the 
stated intention of increasing democracy and participation of blacks in local 
government through the introduction of RSCs. 
In the DFR there is a large black, predominantly African, population outside 
the formal African, coloured, Indian and white areas, with a population 
estimated at some 1 345 981 people (see accompanying box). Administrative 
structures of both an informal and formal nature have developed in these 
areas over the years, are functional and cannot be ignored in the formulation 
of local government policy for the region. 
To reach some understanding of administration in these areas, it is necessary 
to identify and describe the patterns of formal and informal types of bodies 
operating in the administration arena. In this article, a broad outline is 
given of the major patterns of administration in the greater DFR and a few 
examples of operative administrations. An attempt has been made to describe 
the structures through the eyes of the people, rather than in terms of how 
the authorities view them. 
A) Tribal Authorities 
In KwaZulu, a self-governing region which surrounds the Durban metropolitan 
area, the system of local government outside the formal African townships is 
one of tribal or community authorities. Most of the areas referred to in this 
study include the magisterial districts of Umbumbulu, Ndwedwe, Inanda, 
Camperdown, Pinetown and smaller sections of other blocks. Both Umbumbulu and 
Ndwedwe fall under a Regional Authority, where a number of tribal authorities 
share a magistrate, while the Camperdown area is a community authority under 
an amaKholwa Chief. (An amaKholwa Chief is not a traditional Chief, and 
generally has less power than the latter, although he is generally elected.) 
The major portion of the Pinetown and Inanda magisterial districts under 
discussion are administered by the central government and are not formal 
tribal areas, though small areas of formal tribal authority exist. The tribal 
authority structure also occurs in some of the other magisterial districts of 
the study area. 
45 
THE SPATIAL LOCATION OF THE INFORMAL POPULATION IN THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL REGION 
"^SgTSTERIAL DISTRICT SETTLEMENT/TOWNSHIP ESTIMATED POPULATION 
Camperdown (Part of) Fredvilie 
Georgedale & Woodyglen 
Nyuswa (part of) 
Shongweni 







Total 245 272 
"Durban (Part of) Total 11 425 
Inanda (Part of) Lindelani & Ntuzuma 
Released Area 33 




• 102 918 
Total 290 446 
Lower Tugela (Part of) Total 4 323 
Mapumulo (Part of) Total 17 468 
Ndwedwe (Part of) Total 146 223 
New Hanover (Part of) Total 19 283 

















Total 282 584 
Umbumbulu (Part of) Malukazi 
Mgaga 
Umbogintwini 






Total 317 152 
Umlazi (Part of) Total 143 
Urnzinto (Part of) Total 6 538 
TOTAL INFORMAL POPULATION 
OF THE DURBAN FUNCTIONAL 
REGION 1 345 983 
Notes 
• Figures are based on a count of dwellings from aerial photographs taken in 
September 1983. Department of Surveying and Happing, University of Natal. 
9 Occupancy rates supplied by the Inkatha Institute, 
a Boundary defined by Urbanisation Study of the Urban Foundation, 1984. 
The formal structure of administration in these areas is: 






Indunas and Councillors 
I 
Izibonda 
The major role of the tribal officials relates to the structuring and control 
of power, administration and customary law in the area. The magistrate, at 
the Regional Authority level, is also a Commissioner for the administration 
of the area. He is the most important administrator at the local level 
through whom all government functions such as the following are authorised: 
§ the administration of land and settlement 
• the promotion of sound local government 
• the administration of population matters 
§ the provision of guidance and service on customary procedure. 
B) Central Government Involvement 
Central government is directly responsible for a number of African areas in 
the DFR, either through the Department of Development Aid, the Natalia 
Development Board or the State Health Department. These bodies are 
responsible for the formal administrative structures and the provision of 
water, health services, roads and pensions, the issuing of title to land, 
planning, evictions, and allocation of trading sites etc. In some cases they 
also undertake transmission of directives from the Chief Commissioner (the 
government official responsible for Africans in white, coloured and Indian 
urban areas) as well as the receipt of petitions from the communities. 
C) Informal Tribal Authority Administration 
There are a number of areas in the DFR informally administered by adjacent 
tribal authorities. This occurs when former tribal land is administered by 
other formal authorities; and/or when people who owe allegence to a chief of 
an adjacent tribal authority live in a nearby shack area. 
The tribal world-view is that there is no tribe without claim to land: there 
is a great consciousness about land that has been expropriated for one or 
another reason. The power of the Chiefs varies in relation to the number of 
people who owe them allegiance and where they are located. Within this 
system, 'informal' indunas undertake duties such as the reception and 
resolution of residents' complaints and disputes, communication between the 
residents, the Chief and the formal authorities. 
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• ) Informal Residents Associations 
There are between 35-40 shack communities in the DFR, each with at least one 
community-based organisation which takes up civic issues on behalf of the 
community. Every shack community has an Inkatha branch and in only two 
communities there are competing committees. 
The branches use Inkatha structures which reach right up to Ulundi to lobby 
for improvements. Some of the informal administrative roles which these 
branches play include: 
• acquisition of water, payment for water and the reporting of repairs needed 
to water-sources 
» numbering houses in order to divide the community into sections to create 
neighbourhoods and/or to pay for water 
9 refuse disposal by burning or burying 
s lobbying for school sites, creation of community facilities such as creches 
and creating community gardens 
• inviting mobile clinics 
• handling of disputes concerning boundaries, families' or neighbours 
@ preventing police from raiding shack-shops while limiting crime 
§ limiting or preventing evictions, trying to persuade absentee landlords to 
reduce their rents, preventing landlords charging rent on tribal land 
• preventing or limiting the growth and/or expansion of a shack community. 
All these functions are undertaken voluntarily and to some extent 
organisation only occurs when problems arise. Often, the Inkatha branches are 
used by Ulundi as their liaison points within shack communities. 
E) Other Bodies Involved in Administration 
Apart from the types of authorities described above which are the most widely 
occurring and have, in various combinations, responsibility for the great 
majority of people in the informal areas of the DFR, there are numerous other 
types of formal and informal bodies and individuals who are involved in 
administration in these areas. Some of these are: freehold-owners and 
landowners associations, landlords, savings and burial societies, school 
committees, township managers, subordinate indunas, black and white 
businessmen, religious organisations - both African separatist and 
missionary, the Pinetown and Durban municipalities, members of the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly who represent constituencies in the adjacent township or 
rural area, and Inkatha officials (usually Central Committee members) from 
the region. 
A Network of Administrative Relationships 
The majority of the shack areas have a number of administrative bodies, both 
formal and informal, operating at any one point in time. The power of the 
different bodies changes over time according to a whole variety of 
conditions, for example: an influx of strangers who are not from that tribal 
area, the involvement of national political organisations, the emergence or 
disappearance of a community issue such as over water or land, 
48 
the increase or decrease of a particular chief's or induna's power etc. 
In short, a fluid situation exists where administration takes place through 
complicated sets of relationships and levels of power, both formal and 
informal, resulting in a somewhat unstructured communications system. It is 
virtually impossible at this stage to weigh up either the degree of 
responsibility for administration or the number and importance of tasks 
undertaken by the various bodies in each community. 
Where there is congruence between the tribal authority structure and Inkatha 
at the local and/or regional level, administration takes place through 
complex sets of agreements through an informal communication system probably 
based on protocol or hlonipha. 
Consequently, shack areas generally have a combination of leadership, 
groupings, one of which is usually tribally-based, involved in 
administration. These groupings appear to centre around administration and . 
civic issues. 
As there are too many shack areas to list all the administrative bodies 
involved in each one, some examples of a cross-section of communities are 
given: 
Commun i ty Formal Authority Informal Authorities 
Georgedale Ilanga Community Authority 




Holy Ghost Church, 
businessmen and 
individuals 
Ezimbokodweni Umbumbulu Regional Authority 
(tribal structure and 
magistrate) 
Inkatha branch, 
white and black 
businessmen and 
individuals 
Africa (Inanda) Department of Development 











Since the outbreak of violence in Durban in August of last year, many of the 
leaders in the shack areas have become far more conscious of the power of 
their positions. In addition to this., some shack leaders are stating that 
their positions and roles should be formalised to bring them in line with the 
townships. This, among other things, should make those involved in the 
formulation of the Durban RSC far more sensitive to the challenge of 
structuring voting power on the RSC to include shack leaders and their vast 
constituencies. 
As has been shown, the variety of administrative bodies and systems which 
exist in the informal areas of the DFR are wide and complex. Whether or not 
these administrative structures, which the people are used to, would be 
either made more efficient and/or formalised and/or overlaid by the RSC 
should be examined far more closely than has taken place to date. 
Sources 
KwaZulu Diary 1985. 
Heunis C, 'Urban Planning and Constitutional Development'. Speech given to 
the Town and Regional Planners Conference, October 1985. 
Urbanisation study for the Urban Foundation by the Inkatha Institute, 1984. 
Fourie C, Schlemmer L, and Scoggins D, 'People of the Mjondolo's: A Policy 
Orientated Study at the Largest Informal Settlement in South Africa'. 
Forthcoming. 
Department of Surveying and Mapping, University of Natal (Durban), 'The 
Spatial Location of the Informal Population in the Durban Functional 
Region'. 
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8 T H E B R O A D E N I N G O F A U T O C R A C Y 
The Centralisation of Power at Regional Levels Under the Guise of Devolution 
By Prof Dr J S H Gildenhuys of the University of Pretoria 
The proposed Regional Services Councils represent anything but a 'broadening of 
democracy'. Those limited democratic structures and procedures which have hitherto 
existed at the regional level will be effectively, neutralised by the implementation of new 
legislation, which places executive power in the hands of officials nominated, ultimately, 
by the State President. Prof Gildenhuys suggests that nothing indeed will come from 
the policies of decentralisation and devolution except increased political and 
administrative centralisation. 
Gildenhuys shows how essential the establishment of a strong economic component is 
for the autonomous functioning of a municipality, and points out that none of the 
recent proposals will have any real impact on the relative levels of dependence which 
presently exist in African, coloured and Indian urban areas. 
He argues that either one of two options might be effectively pursued to allow the 
balanced development of the economic, social, physical and political components in 
these deprived areas: 
9 either the Group Areas Act and associated regulations should be scrapped, allowing 
the effective merging of racially delineated areas into large integrated municipalities; 
• or, if Group Areas are to be retained, viable and balanced municipalities with a 
strong economic component have to be developed in every area, along with effective 
autonomous local government structures. 
The new legislation introduces a dispensation which is neither here nor there: African, 
coloured and Indian areas will remain dependent on the goodwill (such as it maybe) of 
their more economically viable white neighbours; their potential to develop a stronger 
economic component will remain bound down by the provisions of the Group Areas 
Act, other legislation and government policy which inhibits their economic 
development; their political autonomy will remain circumscribed by tiers of 
government-appointed officials and civil servants not accountable to the public; the 
legitimacy of their local authorities will remain impoverished as it is at present. 
Effective economic integration is simply incompatible with Group Areas: Gildenhuys 
concludes that either the government must throw the doors open socially and 
politically; or it must stick to its apartheid guns and ensure the economic development 
of racially defined areas. Reluctant to commit itself to the full consequences of 
integration, and unable to maintain old-style apartheid in the face of universal 
condemnation, the government has confined itself to a nebulous middle road that, 
instead of a rational programme of constitutional reform, presents the nation with the 
middle stitched together of a patchwork 'adhocracy'. 
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Declared Government Policy 
The State President and senior cabinet ministers have made known that the 
government has accepted the principles of devolution of political power and 
decentralisation of administration, with joint responsibility for common 
affairs and self-determination over own affairs, as basic criteria for future 
constitutional development. Concomitant with this, the State President has 
declared on several occasions that the current constitutional policy is aimed 
at the 'broadening of democracy1 and the extension of the free market system. 
It is justified to deduce that the government is serious in its intention to 
move away from an autocratic elite-democracy to a broader, more directly 
representative democracy with individualism instead of collectivism as its 
foundation. 
Necessary Components for Self-Governing Municipalities 
For any municipality to be truly viable, it is imperative that the four 
components of a municipality - namely the economic, social, political-
institutional and physical components - be fully present in a balanced 
relationship to each other. No viable municipality can exist autonomously if 
only one or two of these components are present and the others are absent. It 
serves no purpose, for example, to concentrate on modern and sophisticated 
political institutions if the social and economic development of the 
municipality concerned is at a low level; in such a case a participation 
crisis will originate. Similarly it serves no purpose to develop a primitive 
political system for a municipal community with a high social and economic 
development level; in such a case a legitimacy crisis will develop. 
Furthermore, no municipal community can develop socially where there is a low 
level of economic development, and no economic development can take place 
under conditions of a low social development level. Without the timely 
provision of physical infrastructure, neither can the development of the 
other three components take place. 
No municipality can achieve any real autonomy unless it has a strong economic 
component. A strong economic component is imperative for a strong tax base, 
which is a pre-requisite for autonomy. Any municipality without a strong tax 
base must remain dependent on outside aid for its continuing existence. No 
self-respecting municipal community likes to continuously have to appeal to 
'benefactors, cap-in-hand, for transfer payments and subsidies in order to 
assure its survival. Those which are dependent on transfer payments and 
subsidies for their continued existence have no option but to subordinate 
themselves to the will and political aims of their benefactors. So-called 
self-governing status becomes, under these circumstances, a farce. 
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Existing Local Government Structures 
While most white municipalities in South Africa have developed in a 
reasonably balanced way, and are able to exist autonomously without aid, the 
development of some white municipalities in metropolitan regions is distorted 
by a deficient economic component. Although these so-called satellite 
municipalities, which are actually metropolitan suburbs, are self-governing, 
their economic components usually only consist of suburban trade activities, 
with a resultant weak tax base. Consequently these municipalities are 
primarily dependent on normal households for their tax income. It is no 
surprise that such municipalities are generally the most expensive to live 
in. For those with a high development level and relatively prosperous 
inhabitants autonomous survival is possible, but at an inordinately higher 
price for the municipal taxpayer. 
In the Indian, coloured and African urban areas, however, one finds an 
especially distorted development which makes autonomy impossible. According 
to the government's traditional separate development policy, the urban areas 
occupied by Indians and coloureds have been regarded as purely residential 
areas with minimal economic development. Those urban areas set aside for 
Africans have been traditionally regarded as purely temporary residential 
areas, for ideological reasons which are well known. 
As a result, these residential areas lack a viable economic component, and 
have poorly-developed political institutions without truly autonomous 
legislative, executive, administrative and taxation powers. Their political 
institutions have merely been of an advisory nature, run and controlled by 
white politicians and civil servants. 
In Indian, coloured and African urban areas the physical components are in 
general equally poorly developed. To some extent social development, in the 
form of housing and recreation, has been attended to, and in Indian urban 
areas - because the government has removed Indian traders from the white 
business districts - there has been a certain degree of concentration on 
trade opportunities. 
In keeping with traditional apartheid policy, Indian, coloured and African 
urban areas, despite their economic and physical interconnections with white 
municipalities, have been viewed politically and socially as separate 
entities. Government policy has in the past exhibited an approach towards 
these communities which may understandably be regarded by them as deeply 
offensive, since it implies that they are or have been unfit to look after 
themselves, or to take part in the government and the administration of the 
municipalities of which they are geopolitically a part. 
Since the Black Local Authorities Act (1982), the African urban areas have 
begun to receive a measure of self-governing municipal status. When looking 
at the Act, however, these black municipal authorities are regulated and 
controlled politically and administratively in an autocratic manner by white 
politicians and civil servants, and there is little evidence of real 
autonomous self-government. 
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The Local Government Affairs Amendment Act (1985), concerning Management 
Coumittees for Indian and coloured areas, has brought a slight change in the 
status quo as it may eventually lead to autonomous self-governing municipal 
status. However, there will be little intrinsic improvement in the inferior 
position of the Indians, coloureds and Africans. It will be another 
government civil servant, namely the Administrator, who after consultation 
with the Management Committees concerned and Municipal Councils, will 
actually decide what their status will be; the Indian and coloured 
communities concerned will still not be allowed to decide this themselves, 
suggesting that they are not yet considered qualified enough to actually 
participate in the final decisionmaking on this matter. 
The amendments suggest more a patchwork 1adhocracy' than they do real 
political and institutional development. The Indian and Coloured Management 
Committees and the African Town and Village Councils still remain inferior 
political institutions subordinate to the central state administration, the 
Development Boards and the white municipal councils, dependent on the 
latters' kind favours and gifts. 
Stumbling Blocks to Development 
Two important central government policy matters impede the balanced 
development of Indian, coloured and African urban areas and municipalities. 
These are: 
« the so-called industrial deconcentration policy, and 
t the physical development of urban areas as reflected in the guide plans of 
the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. 
The first of these, the industrial deconcentration policy, impedes and 
restricts the development of a strong economic component in the Indian, 
coloured and African urban areas of the metropolitan regions. In consequence, 
if this policy continues to be pursued, these urban areas can never be 
expected to be able to become truly autonomous self-governing municipalities. 
Secondly, the guide plans for the development of metropolitan regions 
published by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning regard 
the regions as economically and physically integrated unities. Thus the 
regulations in these plans do not provide for the development of strong 
industrial components in the seperate Indian, coloured and African urban 
areas. 
Both of these policies clash with the government's policy for the 
constitutional development of municipal authorities. The creation of 
autonomous self-governing municipal authorities for the separate ethnic 
groups in their own urban areas is counteracted by both policies, as they 
impeded the development of strong economic components in the African, 
coloured and Indian urban areas. 
The policies further indicate that strong elements characteristic of the 
Verwoerdian ideology of homeland development are still present in government 
planning. The acknowledgement'by the government of the failure of key 
elements of the homeland development policy, in that the presence of Africans 
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in the metropolitan regions as permanent citizens is now accepted, is 
indicative of the failure of the political ideology behind this policy. The 
industrial deconcentration and industrial decentralisation policies are 
likewise unlikely to succeed because they too are based on the same obsolete 
and failed political ideology. 
The Legitimacy Crisis 
The rejection by the Indians in parliament of the Local Government Affairs 
Amendment Act, and the reluctant acceptance of it by the coloured Labour 
Party points to a serious legitimacy crisis in respect of the political-
institutional development of their urban areas. Their political agitation 
over the years is indicative that the management committee system has never 
really been accepted by the Indian and coloured communities. In the African 
urban areas the legitimacy crisis is more serious and deeply entrenched. 
African municipal political institutions, which over the years have undergone 
little more political development than various name changes, have never 
really been accepted by Africans. 
Evaluating Official Constitutional Development Proposals 
1) The first proposal which must be considered is the opening up of the 
central business districts of white municipalities to all races; this policy 
is based on the democratic principle of equal rights and the provision of 
equal opportunities for all citizens of a state. It is doubtful, however, 
whether this will be a final and lasting solution for the African and 
coloured municipalities, as inexperienced and less affluent African and 
coloured businessmen will be unlikely to be able to fend for themselves 
against entrenched white and Indian business. More important, however, this 
policy also does nothing to contribute to the creation and development of a 
strong economic component in the Indian, coloured and African municipalities. 
2) The incorporation of white industrial areas within the demarcation of the 
new racial municipalities is also not a particularly ideal solution. This 
policy may contribute to the creation of an economic component for the new 
municipalities, but not without the first negative consequence of diminishing 
the economic components of the white municipal authorities, and narrowing 
their tax base, with a resultant increase of taxes. While this approach may 
produce a more equitable distribution of economic activities between the 
different urban communities, its total effect will be to impoverish the wider 
community. Such a policy would have to be accompanied by cash incentives for 
industrialists, equal at least to those provided by the industrial 
deconcentration policy, in order to prevent dissatisfaction among 
industrialists concerned. Such a conflict situation at the outset would not 
bode well for such new municipalities. 
The announced expenditure of R1 000m on the upgrading of infrastructure in 
the African urban areas is of marginal importance, since upgrading in the 
absence of a strong economic component offers no permanent solution. This 
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again offers no real economic development potential to the inhabitants of the 
African municipalities. Infrastructure is useless without a matching 
industrial and trade component. 
3) The proposed RSCs represent not a 'broadening of the democracy', but 
rather a moving away from the principles of direct representative democracy 
towards indirect-representative metropolitan political government. The RSCs 
do not comply with the principles of devolution of power and decentralisation 
of administration, whatever has been said. They represent rather a 
centralisation of power and authority on the regional level. Direct voter 
control is frustrated and accountability by officials to the public will be 
difficult if not impossible to exact. 
When examining the large number of central and regional government 
institutions that are and will be concerned with municipal government and 
administration under the new system, one cannot but conclude that there will 
be increased political and administrative centralisatiorr and that nothing 
will come of the policy of devolution and decentralisation. At the moment 
there exist five central state departments, four Administrators-in-Executive 
Committee, 14 Development Boards plus the large number of RSCs that are going 
to be established. The provision of service conditions of the town clerks is 
already centralised and attempts are likely in future to incorporate the 
municipal civil servants under the authority of the Commission for 
Administration. These central state departments, provincial administrators, 
Development Boards and RSCs are going to have to find something to do in 
order to justify their existence. The tendency to regulate, control, curb and 
restrict the activities of municipal government is unlikely to disappear: if 
anything, interference will increase. 
What are the Options? 
The Integrative Option: 
If the government continues with the creation of economic 'grey areas' in the 
metropolitan regions, the opening of other economic and social facilities for 
all ethnic groups, and the setting out of demarcated areas as integrated 
economic, social and physical unities, then the creation of self-governing 
municipal governments for the different ethnic groups in their separate group 
areas makes very little sense. Such municipal governments for Indians, 
coloureds and Africans will be doomed from the start, as they will simply not 
be able to exist autonomously. Short-term patch work, paternalistic aid and 
the creation of RSCs will not offer a lasting solution. Political integration 
will have to match economic and social integration, allowing for the 
development of large integrated municipalities. 
The Segregative Option: 
If the government, however, refuses to scrap the Group Areas Act from the 
statute books, and sticks to separate group areas for the different racial 
groups for which separate autonomous self-governing municipal governments 
have to be created, the long-term solution has to be the creation of viable 
56 
57 
and balanced municipalities for every group area. In this case, the creation 
of a strong economic component together with an acceptable political-
institutional system for the new municipalities would be imperative. By the 
creation of a strong economic component these municipalities would be helped 
to ultimately help themselves, rather than have to look to the more 
prosperous for help and aid via the RSCs. The Physical Planning Act of 1967, 
which restricts industrial development in the metropolitan and other urban 
areas, should then be scrapped, and so should the RSC Act itself. The 
industrial deconcentration policy would also have to be adapted, to make 
provision for the same cash incentives to industrialists of all races for 
industrial establishment in the coloured, Indian and African municipalities 
in order to stimulate industrial development where the actual demand for it 
exists. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that effective economic integration is not viable within the 
parameters of the Group Areas Act. It is submitted that the deregulation and 
industrial development of the existing African, coloured and Indian areas 
would be a better option than the costly and artificial redistribution of 
resources envisaged by the RSC Act, if group areas are to be retained. 
Revenue from taxation should rather be utilised where it will provide the 
best returns, namely in the metropolitan areas where the largest population 
concentrations are and where high unemployment currently exists. Industrial 
development in the Indian, coloured and African municipalities should be 
actively pursued, to enable these areas to develop their economic components, 
rather than the presently envisaged plan which will effectively maintain them 
in an economically inferior position, dependent on the good favours of the 
more powerful white municipalities. 
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9 B A C K T O T H E D R A W I N G B O A R D ? 
By Peter Mansfield, Durban City Councillor 
Many of those who gave a thumbs down to the 'new constitutional dispensation' at 
national level tended to respond more kindly to the idea of Regional Services Councils, 
especially when it became clear that the government intended to include African urban 
areas in the 'new deal' at the third level of government. 
But'many people are now having second thoughts on the issue. This rethink stems 
from two main causes. Firstly, it has become increasingly apparent that a satisfactory 
new deal at local government level is impossible without serious African involvement at 
national level. Secondly, with the exception of Natal, African local authorities are 
collapsing in a heap. Even in Natal there are serious doubts as to whether African local 
authorities will agree to participate in the Regional Services Councils (RSC) system. 
At the beginning of the last parliamentary session, South Africa's major cities were 
abuzz with the news that the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr 
Chris Heunis, was determined to have some RSCs 'in place' by mid-1985. 
In the event, even Minister Heunis' enthusiasm and determination could not achieve the 
impossible. But the RSC Act was rushed through parliament in the dying days of the 
1985 session. Later, the government stated its determination to introduce six RSCs by 
January 1986. These are: Cape Peninsula, Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, Durban and 
Pinetown, Witwatersrand, Bloemfontein and Pretoria. It is clear that it would be 
optimistic to hope that they will be fully operational by the end of 1986. 
In one sense it is understandable that Heunis (increasingly referred to in municipal 
circles as 'the Minister of Everything') is in a hurry to get some RSCs in place. The 
longer he leaves it the less likely they are to come into being - certainly in any form 
which could possibly make any meaningful contribution to South Africa's political or 
constitutional development. 
Durban City Councillor Peter Mansfield presents evidence that the RSCs in their 
proposed form might already be too late for existing black representatives to ever 
become 'representatives' in the true sense of the word, and that it would be wiser to go 
back to the drawing board and hold meaningful negotiations with representative black 
leaders before proceeding further with the plan. 
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Rise (and Fall?) of the Third Tier 
Unfortunately the origins of RSCs are far more deeply rooted in the 
government's search for a constitutional accommodation between whites, 
Indians and coloureds than they are in the search for a really good, 
financially viable system of third tier government for the major metropolitan 
areas of South Africa. Other major factors were the government's needs to 
respond to the growing clamour from white local authorities for additional 
sources of revenue, and to reduce its own financial crisis by off-loading 
some of its financial millstones onto the third tier of government. 
Initially the government forgot about the needs of black urban areas. To its 
credit it was subsequently persuaded that any new form of local government 
needed to include African urban areas (even those in the non-independent and 
independent homelands). In doing so, however, it failed to negotiate African 
inclusion with representative African leaders and instead consulted with 
spokesmen for the thoroughly-rejected black Urban Councils, whose poor 
credibility was further eroded by the suggestion that African political 
aspirations would have to be accommodated within the homeland system and in 
the Urban Councils but not at a national level. 
In the process of developing the RSC Act, the government has had to drop its 
insistence that Indian and coloured areas become autonomous local 
authorities. Had it not done so, even the Indian and coloured participants in 
the parliamentary and local government system would have refused to go along 
with the Bill. In addition, it seems unlikely that white local authorities 
will in fact benefit financially from the new system. 
As things stand, it is highly unlikely that the RSC system will attract the 
participation and support of more than a small proportion of the Indian and 
coloured communities. It is surely time the issue of 'autonomy' for such 
areas was resolved rather than continually ducked and hedged. Until this is 
done, through negotiations with a wide cross-section of Indian and coloured 
leaders, local government elections will continue to be boycotted by as much 
as 90 percent of these communities. The government cannot afford this boycott 
to be repeated in the 1988 local government elections, for Councillors who 
will hold office until 1993. 
African Participation 
More important is the question of African participation in the RSCs. By 
ploughing ahead with the proposed system, the government seems set to 
introduce a system in which the majority of Africans will not participate: at 
best the system will accommodate a few very unrepresentative Africans. In 
political terms the introduction of the RSCs wi11 turn out to be a step in 
the wrong direction - if for no other reason than that they wi11 have become 
seriously tainted by their lack of credibility. 
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The virtual collapse of the Black Local Authority system will have 
consequences for the RSCs. Even if this collapse had not taken place, it 
would have been unrealistic to claim that representation by RSCs would have 
been widely accepted or legitimate in the eyes of those whom they purported 
to represent. The government surely proceeds with the creation of the RSCs in 
the knowledge that a wedge will be driven between the RSCs and the African 
urban areas - a wedge that no expensive, hi-tech servicing of such areas as 
envisaged by the Act will be able to remove. 
The Natai/KwaZulu Axis 
In Natal, the question of African representation on, for example, the Durban 
centred RSC takes a different form. In the formal African townships of 
Lamontvi1le, Chestervi1le, Clermont, Umlazi, KwaMashu, KwaNdengezi and 
KwaMakhutha, at least functioning local authorities exist. The question here 
is whether or not they will agree to participate in the RSC. 
KwaZulu's Chief Buthelezi has frequently stated that he will support moves 
that will improve the lot of the people of KwaZulu. It is arguable that RSCs 
will do so, despite the massive vote-loading in favour of the high-
consumption, developed white areas in the region. 
However, it is known that KwaZulu is particularly upset by this vote-loading 
and by the failure of the government to consult with it on the whole question 
of RSCs, and are weighing up the pro's and con's of whether to allow local 
authorities it controls and Inkatha influences to participate in the system. 
If they decide not to, this would be another powerful argument in favour of 
returning to the drawing board. An additional factor is that the introduction 
of RSCs in Natal/KwaZulu without the co-operation of KwaZulu could have the 
effect of torpedoing the proposed Natal/KwaZulu accord. This could in turn 
have serious consequences for the region and South Africa as a whole. 
In a recent address, the Secretary-General of Inkatha Dr Oscar Dhlomo, put 
the problem as follows: 
'Unless we can reasonably expect some progress in the near future towards 
representation at the centre, we will progressively lose both our interest in 
and support and legitimacy for co-operation and co-participation in the 
affairs of the region. In that conviction we are unshakeable.' 
Informal Settlements 
Natal, and the Durban region in particular, highlight the additional, third-
world aspect of African representation - that of the informal shack 
settlements that do not have the equivalent of town councils that could 
represent than on the RSC. 
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a Town Councillor", they said. "Enjoy prestige, authority, status". 
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In the greater Durban area, two-thirds of the total population of 
approximately 3 million are Africans. Of the African population of between 
1,3 million and 1,5 million, almost two-thirds live in these informal areas. 
By definition these informal areas are those most in need of services that 
the RSCs are designed to provide. Such areas should be involved in setting 
standards, priorities and prices. If not, white/Indian/coloured paternalism, 
however well-meaning, will be rejected and a major aim of the new system - to 
decrease political tension and improve services - will fall flat. It would be 
folly not to ensure that these areas, which are an integral part of the 
region, are represented on the RSCs. 
In fact the Act does allow the Administrator to recognise 1 representative 
bodies' for areas outside the jurisdiction of any local authority or 
management body in the region. It seems unlikely, however, that the Inkatha 
branches or shack committees found in most informal areas in the Durban area 
would be recognised for this purpose. 
One possible solution would be for the KwaZulu government to establish 
'Informal Areas Councils' (possibly one for the northern areas, one for the 
southern areas and one for the western areas of greater Durban Functional 
Region), which could coordinate the needs of the informal areas and act as a 
medium for the representation of such areas on the RSC. 
Indian & Coloured Areas 
The government's initial intention was to create independent local 
authorities out of existing Local Affairs Committees (LACs) and Management 
Committees (MCs) in Indian and coloured areas such as Chatsworth, Mitchell's 
Plain and Lenasia. However, opposition to 'autonomy' in the Houses of 
Delegates and Representatives led the government to climb down on the issue 
and the existing bodies will be given representation on the RSCs. 
In response to pressure from Indian and coloured participants in the tri-
cameral parliament and from existing LACs and MCs the power of these 
initially advisory bodies is in the process of being increased, apparently on 
an ad-hoc incremental basis. 
This is in line with the government's determination to push Indian and 
coloured local areas closer to autonomy. It also parallels the changes which 
have taken place in African local government. 
But such a process has two major drawbacks. First, the situation cries out 
for a total 'new deal' which should not be confused with an extension or 
restructuring of the existing system of local government. Any incremental 
reform to the existing LAC/MC system may be reassuring and ego-boosting to 
the present incumbents of such committees, but it also virtually guarantees 
that the 1988 local government elections will be heavily boycotted by the 
Indian and coloured communities and that these communities and the RSCs will 
be saddled with non-representative councillors until the following round of 
elections in 1993. 
63 
Given the Indian and coloured communities' strong grassroots opposition to 
autonomous racially constituted local authorities and the government's 
implacable opposition to integrated local authorities, is there any direction 
in which a 'solution' might be found? 
A possibility might lie in the scrapping of all existing LACs in 1988 and 
their replacement by semi-autonomous town councils. Such town councils would 
have their own budgets (financed by local rates, transfer payments from the 
white 'mother city', and possibly some income from their RSC) for which they 
would be completely responsible. In addition, they could have representatives 
on the 'mother city' Council and vice versa. Their representatives could have 
voting as well as speaking rights. 
Such a system would have the advantage of dealing with the second major 
drawback of the existing tendency towards incremental reform. More power but 
no responsibility is being devolved to the LACs, a tendency which spells 
CRISIS. One example should make this clear. 
It seems likely that LACs may be given power to determine administration 
charges and policies towards rents arrears in council housing schemes. 
Decisions on these matters could cost millions, and if the LACs are not 
responsible for budgeting the cost of such decisions, it will result" in a 
system of power without responsibility, which will have disastrous 
consequences. 
Clearly then a new system is needed. It should be negotiated now. Such 
negotiations should include the existing LACs and the new houses of 
parliament, but a serious attempt should be made to include existing non-
participants in the negotiating process. If this is not achieved and 
negotiations are limited to in-house discussions, another virtual guarantee 
of non-participation will have been established. 
Allocation of Resources 
'Provided that in determining the priorities in connection with the 
appropriation of funds, the council shall give preference to the 
establishment, improvement and maintenance of infrastructural services and 
facilities in areas where the greatest need therefor exists ' Regional 
Services Councils Act, Section 12 (vi). 
These words, taken in conjunction with the fact that the RSC's detailed 
budget requires the consent of the Minister of Finance and that 'any local 
body represented on the council and whose interests are affected by a 
decision of that council may appeal against that decision' to the 
Administrator or Minister of Finance, have enormous implications for the 
workings of RSCs. 
In plain language this means that the RSC's resources are to be channeled 
into under-serviced and unserviced black areas. It almost certainly means 
that few, if any, resources will find their way into the developed white 
municipalities and that even the Indian and coloured areas will, at best, 
benefit only marginally. 
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Potentially this creates an explosive political situation - one in which 
those groups who have access to the levers of lobbying and political power, 
the white, Indian and coloured areas, will not benefit from the new system. 
This explosive potential is exacerbated by the fact that the new system was 
ostensibly, in part, designed as a response to long-standing and growing 
demands by white local authorities and Indian and coloured LACs/MCs for 
additional sources of revenue for their own areas. 
There is, however, in the present political climate some reason for optimism 
that the participating white, Indian and coloured representatives will 
r.apidly gain an appreciation of the extent of the under-servicing in the 
African areas. 
On the negative side is the provision in Section 8 (iii) of the Act which 
allows a local authority or other representative body to replace its 
nominated representative(s) on the RSC at any time. This apparently 
democratic clause could result in white local authorities withdrawing 
representatives who gain an appreciation of the needs of the African areas, 
and replacing them with representatives who undertake to ensure that more 
resources are channeled into white areas instead. 
The clause certainly does mean that representatives will have to be 
continually looking over their shoulders at the bodies that appointed them 
and will be less free to concentrate on the needs of the region as a whole. 
Devolution of Power? 
Government spokesmen in general, and Minister Heunis in particular, have 
frequently repeated the claim that the changes in second and third tier 
levels of government represent a devolution of power. There is little 
evidence to support this view. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the 
changes represent a further centralisation of power and a limited devolution 
of administration. 
Clearly at the provincial level, the abolition of elected Provincial Councils 
and Executive Committees (Excos) and their replacement with government-
appointed Excos represent a centralisation of power. At the RSC level the 
budgets of the RSCs will be subject to the detailed scrutiny of the Minister 
of Finance. At present, local authority budgets are subject to macro-control 
by the State Treasury but not to detailed scrutiny. These measures will 
ensure a tightening of control by the central government. 
Nevertheless, the creation of new sources of revenue for the RSCs is 
certainly a step in the direction of devolution of power, provided the RSCs 
are not dictated to as to how to spend this revenue. 
Another apparent step in the devolution of power is the transferring of 
responsibility for (and financing the massive subsidies required by) 
passenger transport. Again this will only amount to devolution of 
administration unless the existing government-appointed Local Road 
Transportation Boards are replaced by bodies that are appointed by the RSCs. 
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Otherwise the RSCs will simply find themselves administering and financing 
the dictates of government-appointed bodies. 
Economic Development 
Astonishingly the RSC Act makes no provison for the Councils to play a role 
in the economic development of its region. Yet there can be no doubt that 
economic development will be required if private sector income and the 
envisaged RSC taxes that go with it, are to be increased. Thus the level of 
economic development will be the decisive factor in determining whether the 
RSC can deliver the goods it is supposed to deliver and whether the 
recipients can pay for those goods. Local and regional government should be 
as concerned with job creation and economic development as it is with 
administration and the provision of services. 
Despite the examples of local level economic development teams in North 
America and elsewhere, South African cities remain wedded to the view that 
their job is administration, and the money will look after itself. The City 
of Durban is a case in point. It employs more than 15 000 workers -•everyone 
of whom is involved with administration and the provision of services. Not a 
single employee is charged with the task of attracting industry to the city, 
encouraging small business development and getting rid of restrictive 
legislation which discourages the entrepreneurial spirit. The situation in 
other major South African cities is not dissimilar. 
It is essential that this attitude changes. Serious unemployment exists now, 
and indications are that it will get worse in the decade ahead. The sort of 
economic development required to sustain the provision and maintenance of 
services in the metropolitan areas is simply not going to happen by itself. 
At very least it is essential that the RSCs invest political effort and human 
and financial resources into stimulating such growth. 
RSCs vs Mega-Cities 
The alternative to the creation of RSCs is the 'Mega-City' concept, whereby 
all areas within a region would be included within a single local authority. 
It is understandable that many spokesmen for the Indian, coloured and African 
communities (who have been effectively excluded from the decisionmaking 
process up to now) should argue in favour of the latter system. It would, 
after all, be the most specific indication of full inclusion and would have 
the advantage of virtually guaranteeing full participation by all racial 
groups. However, it would not necessarily be the best form of local 
government for South Africa's major cities. 
Arguments against such a system include: 
• Such cities would be too big and local communities would find it difficult 
to express their individual preferences. 
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• For historical and political reasons such as the workings of the Group 
Areas Act, there are enormous differences between the various components of 
South Africa's major metropolitan areas. 
Under the circumstances, some form of metropolitan system of local government 
is probably a good idea. However that does not mean that the proposed RSCs 
are the best available form of metro government. Indeed the system shows 
every sign of having been cobbled together by national politicians rather 
than regional representativees. Why else would it be considered necessary to 
impose a uniform system on the whole country? Why not allow each region to 
develop its own system? 
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10 C O N C L U D I N G A S S E S S M E N T 
A Crisis of Evolutionary Reform? 
By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer 
When black urban communities were removed from the jurisdiction of local 
authorities as a result of the Bantu Affairs Administration Act No 45 of 
1971, there was widespread criticism of the new policy. Both the United 
Party and the Progressive Party had opposed the Bill in parliament, claiming 
inter alia that separate local administrations for blacks in urban areas 
would not work. Councillor Lewis, Chairman of the Johannesburg City Council 
Management Committee, argued that 'African administration depends on 
specialist services provided by municipal accountants, legal assistants, 
medical officers, engineers, auditors and computer staff it is difficult 
to see how the services at present provided will be available to the Boards 
to be appointed 1 (Horrel, et al 1972). 
Now, nearly fifteen years later, the impossibility of providing separate but 
adequate (not even to mention equal) services to local communities has been 
conceded by the new Regional Services Councils (RSC) Act. This is not to 
say that the position before 1971 was adequate. Services in black areas 
were generally poor then as well. Only 21 out of more than 450 local 
authorities were providing essential transfer funding by subsidising their 
black revenue accounts out of the general municipal budgets (Hansard 1971). 
The separation of local services coupled with the idea of financial self-
sufficiency of black local authorities, however, is general ly perceived as 
having been a failure over the past decade and a half. 
The RSC Act, at one level, is a response to this failure and to a critically 
urgent need to develop the service infrastructure of all communities out of 
common revenue funds, utilising the available technical, administrative and 
professional expertise in the most efficient manner. Given that most black 
local authority areas are sti11 without the minimum services expected and 
enjoyed by other communities, the sooner joint provision of services funded 
from a common budget can commence the better. This is no doubt what prompted 
Mr Raymond Parsons, Chief Executive of Assocom, to recommend that 
1 organised business must do what it can to make a practical success of 
what has now been decided by parliament'(Financial Mail 19/7/85: p43). 
Regrettably, political life in South Africa is not that simple. The 
argument that the RSCs are vastly better than the system they replace, while 
true in practical terms, may be very dangerous. This statement is made 
while fully acknowledging the obvious validity of many of the points made in 
the defence of the new Act by Minister Heunis (Financial Mail 23/8/85: p70). 
It is absolutely imperative, however, that in South Africa today with its 
mobilised potential for confrontation and instability, each reform must be 
assessed against a background of the entire complex of political and economic 
inter-relationships. Are the RSCs a 'step in the right direction'? 
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Some Positive Features 
Positive features of the new system include: 
• The functions of the RSCs, coupled with the provision in the Act that 
larger local authorities can provide services to others on an agency basis 
within the overall scope of regional planning, will undoubtedly make it 
possible to improve both the hard service infrastructure and some of the so-
called 'soft' services in poorer local areas. 
• The principle of a tax on the wealth of a region, allowing local 
authorities with a low tax-base to benefit from the wealth they help to 
create through their labour, is obviously a positive feature. 
• The provisions for the inclusion on the RSCs of Local Affairs Committees 
and Management Committees as member institutions with local authorities, and 
even the possible inclusion by Provincial Administrators of other bodies 
such as, say, residents1 associations from shack communities, can very 
constructively widen the scope of the councils' activities and coverage. 
• The Councils are to be at least one official forum on which different races 
sit together to take decisions. These bodies can loosely be described as 
'multiracial', which is a form of progress in our society. This feature is 
reinforced by the fact that, as from July 1985, the black local authorities 
became the responsibility of the Department of Constitutional Development 
and Planning and no longer of the then Department of Co-operation and 
Development, which has been a source of political 'stigma' in the past. 
Problematic Features 
These advantages are considerable. They have to be weighed up against the 
following problematic features of the legislation, however: 
t While there appears to be widespread support for the principle of a 
decentralisation of ministerial powers to local government (President's 
Council 1982), the RSC Act gives the impression of a greater concentration of 
power at central government level with merely a devolution of functions to 
local levels (our emphasis) (Assocom 1985). Professor Gildenhuys makes no 
bones about this in his contribution to this volume. The Administrator's 
powers to delimit and establish RSCs can only be exercised after consultation 
with or concurrence by the minister. Furthermore, the Minister of Finance 
has wide and broadly defined powers in regard to the raising of regional 
revenue and budgets of the RSCs. 
• The Assocom memorandum also points out that a wide range of forms of co-
operation between local authorities are occurring already, and this co-
operation could increase in scope in the future years under the present 
system (ibid: p6). 
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• Some degree of recognition of the weight of financial contributions to 
the RSCs1 budgets would be appropriate in the formula for representation on 
the Councils. The system of representation, despite certain safeguards, is 
so heavily weighted in favour of the larger local authorities, however, that 
resistance or resentment from poorer local bodies is bound to emerge. The 
Assocom memorandum expresses the fear that ' non-white local government may 
not benefit .... to the extent intended or envisaged 1 (Assocom ibid: p7). 
• The proposed new taxation systems are particularly problematic. If it 
is true, as contributors to this volume and Assocom have argued, that the 
payrol1 tax (Regional Services levy) wi11 induce labour-saving in the private 
sector and that the taxation in general will encourage industry to move away 
from the cities, then the consequences of the new system wi11 be negative 
indeed for the cities. Unemployment is a major factor underlying the 
present urban unrest, and what our cities require is a dynamic programme of 
job-creation rather than policies which, however subtly, will discourage 
employment growth. 
• A major factor bearing upon the RSCs is their political legitimacy. 
This is a problem affecting both smaller white and the African, coloured and 
Indian local areas. There are rumblings from smaller white local authorities 
to the effect that they do not wish to subsidise townships in the new deal 
and this issue will be exploited by right-wing parties. 
The major political problems, however, 1ie in the black sector. Black local 
authorities, as indicated in the introduction, have manifest problems of 
political acceptance. Any new regional dispensation cannot play with fire -
it must absolutely guarantee that black local authorities participating will 
be able to deliver the goods. This, as the comments above indicate, is by 
no means certain. As contributor Mansfield points out, even the KwaZulu 
government is uncertain about the implications of the .RSC in Natal. We can 
ill-afford a new wave of protests and demonstrations, ct la tricameral 
parliament or the 'Koornhof Bills', about RSCs. 
Some opposition will be inevitable from extra-parliamentary organisations in 
particular. In part it will be due to the fact that the new system further 
institutionalises group areas and separate local authorities. Some 
influences will oppose the measures for fear that they might just work in 
boosting the credibility of establishment-oriented black leaders. 
Given these problems, as well as the very real functional issues which have 
been mentioned above, the problem of political opposition to the new 
dispensation seems likely to be quite severe. 
• The limitation of the functions of the Councils to the provision of 
'hard services' or so-called 'general affairs' neglects the fact that most of 
the poorer local authorities also have a critical need for skills and 
resources for the provision of 'soft services' like housing, recreation and 
health. 
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The new legislation will be implemented in the course of the next few months. 
Minister Heunis has expressed his determination to proceed, for perfectly 
understandable reasons. The legislation, after all is said and done, 
represents an advance on the current situation as it applies to poorer local 
authorities. 
There appears to be little point, therefore, in calling for the abandonment 
of the new system at this late stage (this has been an appeal in the past but 
Minister Heunis did not appear to be impressed - see for example, Hermann 
Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, 'Don't Settle for Less', Financial Mail, 
2/8/85: p55, and the rejoinder by Minister Heunis 'Redistributing Local 
Wealth', Financial Mail, 23/8/85: p70). 
It would seem constructive to suggest, then, that the Minister be taken at 
his word that the RSC Bill is not the last word in constitutional 
development at the third tier of government; to quote Raymond Parsons of 
Assocom '(the business sector) is heartened by the acknowledgement by 
Minister Chris Heunis that the Legislation is "not perfect"' (Financial Mai 1 
19/7/85: p43). Given this admission, the Minister may be willing to 
countenance or encourage an evolutionary process of local government reform, 
starting with the RSC as presently constituted as an interim step. 
Consultation & Negotiation 
What I would like to suggest is that once a few major Regional Services 
CounciIs have been established, these CounciIs be given the task of 
establishing machinery for making contact with and negotiating with black 
local authorities, black civic associations, other relevant community 
groupings, including white interests as well as the private sectors in the 
region. 
If and when functioning consultation and negotiation is proceeding and 
various suggestions are coming forward as to the kind of system of third tier 
government which could be acceptable, a larger committee drawn from the 
various CounciIs and their negotiating partners could be established to 
consider the inputs and begin to formulate proposals for submission to the 
Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. 
It is pointless to debate the forms which changes to the Regional Services 
Councils might take, because the whole point of the exercise should be to 
involve all parties as fully as possible in a consideration of the system and 
its modification. The Regional Services CounciIs should approach their own 
future with as open an agenda as possible because it is precisely the need 
for early and full negotiation with al1 relevant community groups, both 
formal and informal, which is the highest priority of all. 
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